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Since the initiation of economic reforms in the late 1980s, the Communist Party of 
Vietnam (CPV) has increasingly focused on updating its sea and air capabilities while 
also enhancing its foreign defense relations. Since then, military capabilities outside of 
Vietnam’s ground forces have increased with the addition of more modern equipment. 
After the Soviet Union’s collapse, Vietnam expanded its military procurement network 
and general defense policy beyond Russia. What are the specific details of these 
modernization efforts?  
As Vietnam’s economy has developed, its relationship with the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) has varied due to conflicting territorial claims in the South China Sea 
(SCS). The PRC took the Paracel Islands from Vietnam in 1974 and portions of the 
Spratly Islands in 1988 and the mid-1990s; its assertive SCS behavior toward Vietnam 
has continued. Since 1986, Vietnam’s dramatic economic growth and development focus 
has led to military updates but also to a growing defense industry as it pursues 
industrialized status by 2020. Through historical analysis, this thesis seeks to answer the 
following question: What are the causes and implications of military modernization 
initiated by the CPV after the Doi Moi reforms of 1986? 
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 1 
I. VIETNAM’S DRIVE TO MODERNIZE MILITARILY—
MOTIVATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
What are the causes and implications of military modernization initiated by the 
Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) after the Doi Moi reforms of 1986? Since then, 
Vietnam has attempted to boost naval and air force capabilities and increased cooperation 
agreements and strategic partnerships with a variety of world players.1 Exploring the 
influence of China and Vietnam’s economic growth and strategies, this thesis will 
identify the motivations behind Vietnam’s military modernization. The conclusion will 
focus on the implications of Vietnam’s military modernization efforts. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
As China continues to project power in the South China Sea (SCS), some of its 
neighbors have begun to improve their own military capabilities. In Southeast Asia, 
Vietnam has taken the greatest steps in this direction, partly because it is closest to China 
and has the longest record of armed conflict with China over maritime and land borders.2 
As Vietnam modernizes, its ability to defend its territorial claims is likely to rise. The 
effects of CPV’s military modernization on the regional security environment could be 
either destabilizing or stabilizing. 
1. Destabilization 
Vietnam’s military modernization program is an important issue, because it could 
possibly lead to a destabilizing environment in the SCS. The Philippines has experienced 
standoffs with the Chinese, but Vietnam’s military clashes with China in 1974, 1988, 
2012, and 2014 surpass Manila’s experience. As Vietnam modernizes a force that already 
surpasses the capabilities of other Southeast Asian (SEA) claimants, its confidence in 
                                                 
1 Carlyle Thayer, The Vietnam People’s Army under Doi Moi (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1994), 1–2, 41–45. 
2 Robert Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron—The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific (New York: 
Random House, 2014), 51–71. 
 2 
defending maritime claims will surely increase. This development could lead to 
inadvertent confrontation with China as China seeks greater influence and control over 
territorial claims in the SCS. Currently, Vietnam does not maintain the capability to deter 
China, and until it does, China will likely continue to act assertively, creating a 
destabilized environment. Vietnam has revealed to the international community that 
while its force is incomparable to China’s, it will still confront China over territorial 
claims. Depending on the degree of escalation, a destabilizing regional environment in 
the SCS could lead to drastic economic effects due to the large volume of trade activity 
transiting through the SCS.  
2. Stabilization 
On the other hand, Vietnam’s military modernization program could possibly lead 
to stabilizing effects in the SCS, because it sends a signal to China that the People’s 
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is not the only capable regional force. Because China’s 
military capability likely surpasses not just Vietnam’s but the collective forces of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) bloc, the time for China to project 
power in the SCS is now.3 As Vietnam modernizes, the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) may feel less prone to engage in conflict with Vietnam and more likely to pursue 
settling claims in the SCS. If Vietnam achieves a deterrent force, then China might be 
less likely to act assertively in the SCS, and the result may lead to stabilization. Also, 
Vietnam’s increasingly close relations with New Delhi, Washington, Tokyo, Manila, and 
other strategic partners could serve as a deterrent to China, especially considering the 
strong U.S. footprint currently in the region.4 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Information is readily available concerning Vietnam’s steps toward military 
modernization, but analysis of those capabilities and the reasons behind modernization 
                                                 
3 Michael Peck, “The Five Most Deadly Armies of Asia,” The National Interest, November 3, 2014, 
ttp://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-five-most-deadly-armies-asia-11589. 
4 Carlyle Thayer, “Vietnam Mulling New Strategies to Deter China,” The Diplomat, May 28, 2014, 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/vietnam-mulling-new-strategies-to-deter-china/. 
 3 
are lacking. This thesis will identify the reasons for Vietnam’s emphasis on military 
modernization, assessing the most likely causes behind it. There are two leading 
hypotheses concerning Vietnam’s defense modernization. The first and most widely 
accepted is the belief that modernization efforts are a reaction to China’s assertive 
behavior in the SCS. A second hypothesis claims that Vietnam’s rapid economic growth 
has created an opportunity for Vietnam to improve its outdated military capabilities and 
pursue industrialization.  
1. Why is Vietnam modernizing its military?  
One possible explanation behind CPV defense modernization is that Vietnam is 
reacting to China’s assertive behavior in the SCS. China’s actions in the SCS might be 
forcing Vietnam to modernize and defend claims in the SCS. China continues to 
modernize its military and her capabilities surpass Vietnam’s. Vietnam has been able to 
witness China’s military buildup firsthand. In 2008, commercial imagery revealed to the 
international community the construction of a major PLAN base on Hainan Island near 
the northern coast of Vietnam.5 IHS Jane’s was aware of this information in 2004, also 
reporting on the placement of a Chinese SSBN near Hainan in December 2007.6 
Vietnam’s decision to order Kilo-class submarines in 2009 could have been a response to 
developments on Hainan. China has invaded Vietnam 17 times, but while border issues 
are relatively settled, conflict has extended to the maritime environment.7 Simply, 
Vietnam cannot accept China’s nine-dash-line, which overlaps its claims.8 The 
government is building up its military to deter China in the SCS and send a message that 
it is serious about defending maritime territory and its sovereignty.9  
                                                 
5 Richard D. Fisher, “Secret Sanya - China’s New Nuclear Naval Base Revealed,” IHS Jane’s, April 
15, 2014, https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType 
=News&ItemId=+++1195510&Pubabbrev=JIR. 
6 Ibid. 




Vietnam’s economic growth has enabled military modernization and has also 
promoted a stronger defense industry.10 In 2007, Vietnam became a member of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) after experiencing high gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth rates in the early 2000s.11 Maintaining one of the largest standing armies in SEA, 
ground-based procurements are currently less important for Vietnam.12 Air force and 
naval modernization is necessary, because older equipment and platforms lack the 
capabilities to perform in the modern era.13 Also in 2007, the country announced its goal 
to be modernized by 2020, focusing on industry and military sectors—especially the 
maritime region.14 The push for Kilo submarines, which was purportedly central to the 
2007 modernization policy, occurred before Vietnam was aware that submarines would 
be placed at the PLAN’s base on Hainan Island.15 A socioeconomic goal for the CPV is 
to build its defense industry, and expanding defense relations leads to collaborative 
ventures, which strengthen Vietnam’s industrial capacity.16 The purpose of Vietnam’s 
modernization is bigger than deterring China, because a significant portion of it is meant 
to strengthen Vietnam as it pursues industrialization.17  
                                                 
10 Ministry of National Defense, Vietnam National Defense (Vietnam, Vietnam: Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam, 2009), 96. 
11 Vuong Quan Hoang, “Vietnam’s Economic Challenges,” Stratfor, August 21, 2012, 
http://Army.stratfor.com/the-hub/vietnams-economic-challenges. 
12 Greg Torode, “Vietnam Building Deterrent against China in Disputed Seas with Submarines,” 
Reuters, September 7, 2014, http://Army.reuters.com/article/2014/09/07/us-vietnam-submarines-china-
insight-idUSKBN0H20SF20140907. 
13 “IHS Jane’s - Vietnam  > Navy,” August 19, 2014, https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Custom 
Pages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=Reference&ItemId=+++1305175&Pubabbrev=SEA; “IHS Jane’s 
- Vietnam > Air Force,” August 19, 2014, https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages/Janes/Dis 
playPage.aspx?DocType=Reference&ItemId=+++1305174&Pubabbrev=SEA. 
14 Nguyen Hung Son, “Vietnam: A Case Study in Naval Modernization,” in Naval Modernization in 
South-East Asia: Nature, Causes, and Consequences, ed Geoffrey Till and Jane Chan (New York: 
Routledge, 2010), 126–131. 
15 Jon Grevatt, “Vietnam Likely to Barter for Kilo Boats, Says Source,” IHS Jane’s, accessed May 9, 
2014, https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages/Janes/Dis playPage.aspx?ShowProd 
uctLink=true&DocType=News&ItemId=+++1206921&Pubabbrev=JNI.  
16 Ministry of National Defense, Vietnam National Defense, 39, 20, 40, 43, 46, 96. 
17 Ibid. 
 5 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since 1986, Vietnam has sought to modernize militarily, and as the country has 
progressed economically, military acquisitions and defense partnerships have increased.18 
The possible explanations behind the CPV’s decision to modernize its military are 
various. Some authors argue that China’s territorial ambitions or Vietnam’s economic 
performance and strategies are main motivators; others argue for some combination of 
these factors. After years of noteworthy economic growth, Vietnam is preparing to be an 
industrialized country in less than a decade, and its defense modernization may have 
regional implications.19 This literature review is broken into three sections: details of 
modernization, causes of modernization, and implications of modernization. 
1. Details of Military Modernization in Vietnam 
Concerning Vietnam’s pursuit of capabilities to defend claims in the SCS, IHS 
Jane’s provides valuable details. The firm’s database regarding Vietnamese defense 
procurement begins to populate at a quicker rate around the beginning of the twenty-first 
century. Updated in April 2014, Jane’s outlook on army procurements is bleak compared 
to naval, air force, and coast guard developments. The firm references the 2009 defense 
white paper that places a larger emphasis on ground forces but notes that this addition is 
likely meant to assuage the army’s concern with the government’s shift towards sea and 
air. Efforts to modernize the army’s main battle tanks have largely been neglected for 
lack of funds. Jane’s reports that more capable Su-30 or Sukhoi fighters are replacing 
MiG fighter jets and that Vietnamese defense firms have created at least six unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAV) since 2013. IHS Jane’s reporting confirms that new submarines, 
frigates, corvettes, patrol craft, and fixed and rotary wing aircraft have been added or 
ordered to complement the navy’s enhanced capability.20  
                                                 
18 Thayer, The Vietnam People’s Army, 1–2, 41–45. 
19 Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, “Strategy for Socio-Economic 
Development 2011–2020” (presented at the Eleventh National Congress, Vietnam, Vietnam, January 12–
29, 2011). 
20 Paragraph details pulled directly from IHS Jane’s, “Vietnam > Procurement.”  
 6 
Jane’s reports increased defense cooperation between Vietnam and powers across 
the globe. Russia continues to be a main supplier of Vietnamese military equipment, but 
Vietnam has widened its procurement network to include the Czech Republic, Ukraine, 
and Poland.21 Since the signing of a defense agreement in 2000, India and Vietnam have 
expanded relations to include increased arms sales, training, and equipment repairs.22 
Continuing towards greater cooperation, the countries signed a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) in 2007 that included agreements on further training.23 Leading 
delegations to Brazil, South Africa, Israel, East Asia, and Europe, Vietnam began 
initiating an effort to expand defense cooperation in 1993.24 In November 2003, the USS 
Vandergrift pulled into the port of Saigon in Ho Chi Minh City, marking the first time in 
30 years that a U.S. vessel anchored in Vietnam.25 Since this visit, Vietnam has allowed 
increased humanitarian projects and ship visits, leading to warmer relations with 
Washington.26 After Vietnam’s groundbreaking purchase of six Kilo-class submarines in 
2009, the Vietnamese decided to pursue the refurbishment of Cam Ranh Bay, providing 
the country a suitable deep-water port for foreign navies.27 Vietnam’s progress 
establishes it as a possible place-not-base alternative for Washington and a suitable focus 
for India’s “Look East” policy. 
2. Causes of Military Modernization in Vietnam  
Vietnam’s program is likely due to China’s assertive SCS behavior, a desire to 
diminish fears, and an attempt to challenge the two state’s asymmetric relationship. The 
most likely reason that Vietnam is modernizing its military is to cope with China’s 
increasingly assertive policy in the SCS, which is forcing Vietnam to defend its territorial 
                                                 
21 IHS Jane’s, “Vietnam > Procurement.” 




24 Thayer, The Vietnam People’s Army, 1–2, 41–45. 
25 Casey Lucius, “Improvements in Military Relations: U.S.–Vietnam Military-to-Military 
Engagement from 2003–2013” (paper presented during meetings in Vietnam, December 2013). 
26 Ibid. 
27 IHS Jane’s, “Vietnam > Procurement.” 
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claims there. Writers who make this argument usually claim Vietnam seeks to build a 
military capability sufficient to deter China from further encroaching on territory that 
Vietnam claims. One of the most prominent proponents of this argument is Robert 
Kaplan, who devotes a chapter of his book on the SCS problem to Vietnam. For Kaplan, 
Vietnam is the only roadblock preventing China from winning control over the SCS. In 
discussing the historical relationship between the two countries, he mentions Vietnam’s 
paranoia with China, explaining that tension shifted from land to maritime disputes after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Interviewing several Vietnamese defense officials, 
Kaplan reports that Vietnam’s leadership believes China’s economy will enable it to 
increase its SCS naval presence and exploit energy there. Such a move by China is 
forcing Vietnam to stand its ground and promote nationalism previously seen during the 
American War. Kaplan uses the purchase of six Kilo-class submarines to illustrate 
Vietnam’s desire to be taken seriously. For Kaplan, the refurbishment of Cam Ranh Bay 
as Vietnam’s preeminent deep-water port is meant to counter China. He clearly portrays 
China as the reason behind Vietnam’s drive for military modernization.28  
Vietnam expert Carlyle Thayer stresses that because “Vietnam’s strategic 
environment has become more complex due to the rise of China and the modernization of 
the People’s Liberation Army…greater emphasis has been placed on Vietnam’s 
capabilities to protect its offshore territorial claims.”29 For Thayer, Vietnam’s emphasis 
on naval acquisitions is also meant to counter the submarine threats posed by China and 
other neighbor states.30 In a separate Wall Street Journal article, Thayer attributes 
Vietnam’s increased coordination with the United States to its desire to “hedge against 
China’s rising military power.”31 In 2011, Thayer proposed that a key Vietnamese 
scheme for managing relations with China included self-help or military modernization, 
                                                 
28 Paragraph details pulled directly from Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron—The South China Sea and the End 
of a Stable Pacific, 51–63. 
29 Carlyle Thayer, “Vietnam People’s Army: Development and Modernization,” (paper presented to 
the Sultan Haji Bolkiah Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, August 
23, 2009).  
30 Ibid. 
31 Carlyle Thayer, “Vietnam’s Defensive Diplomacy,” Wall Street Journal, August 19, 2010, sec. 
Opinion, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ SB10001424052748703649004 57543847408388449. 
 8 
focusing on area denial.32 For Vietnam, territorial claims are important in the SCS for 
securing its sovereignty and economic interests there.  
Explaining Vietnam’s posture towards China, Le Hong Hiep argues that China’s 
rise has caused Vietnam to fear Chinese expansionism once again. As a result of this fear, 
Vietnam has pursued partnerships with foreign powers in hopes of deterring China or 
balancing against it. Le Hong Hiep reports that Vietnam’s interest in strengthening its 
military ties with Washington has been to counter China’s rise and aggressive actions in 
the SCS. The SCS is of utmost importance to Vietnam because of its role in economic 
activities, which include fishing, tourism, and oil and gas exploitation. In its possible 
pursuit of regional hegemony, China is trying to undermine these activities and has a 
history of doing so, previously seizing Vietnamese fishing vessels and cutting the cables 
of survey ships in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). To deter Chinese 
aggression and possible expansionism, Vietnam may have decided to pursue naval 
modernization and increase diplomatic relations with foreign powers.33  
Asia correspondent for the South China Morning Post Greg Torode writes that 
strategists are monitoring “Vietnam’s attempt to create a maritime deterrent against its 
giant neighbor.”34 Vietnam’s increased cooperation with Russia, India, the United States, 
Canada, Czech Republic, and Israel mark its desire to create leverage against China.35 
Vietnamese leaders understand that they cannot compete with China’s modernization but 
think achieving a long-term deterrent force is possible.36 Witnessing training, energy 
exploration cooperation, and arms sales, China would likely prefer a weaker India-
                                                 
32 Carlyle Thayer, “The Tyranny of Geography: Vietnamese Strategies to Constrain China in the 
South China Sea,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 33, no. 3 
(2011): 348–69. 
33 Paragraph details pulled directly from Le Hong Hiep, “Vietnam’s Strategic Trajectory: From 
Internal Development to External Engagement,” Strategic Insights ASPI 59 (2012): 6–11 
34 Greg Torode, “Vietnam’s Military Growth Raising Eyebrows in Region,” South China Morning 
Post, January 27, 2012, http://Army.scmp.com/print/article/991004/vietnams-military-growth-raising-
eyebrows-region. 
35 Le Hong Hiep, “Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy against China Since Normalization,” Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 35, No. 3 (2013): 334. 
36 Thayer, “Vietnam Mulling New Strategies to Deter China.” 
 9 
Vietnam relationship.37 Defense News writer Wendell Minnick adds, “China’s military 
modernization efforts and problems in the SCS have been the primary driver for 
Vietnam’s procurement of six new conventional Kilo-class submarines from Russia”38 
Minnick and numerous other scholars report that Vietnam and other ASEAN countries 
have been hastily modernizing their militaries in response to perceived Chinese 
aggression.39  
Executing a streamlined modernization program due to economic progress, 
Vietnam is modernizing its military to simply update capabilities.40 Its push for a modern 
military force is not likely targeting China, because Vietnam is currently incapable of 
achieving a comparable force. The Straits Times writer Robert Karniol argues that “the 
acquisition of some sophisticated platform or system does not necessarily translate into 
an effective capability.”41 He highlights Thailand’s lone aircraft carrier as an example but 
avoids comparing Vietnam’s recent acquisitions to Thailand’s irrelevant carrier.42 
Illustrating the beginning of Vietnam’s initiative to progress economically and militarily, 
Karniol points to the Doi Moi policy introduced in 1986 as the catalyst for 
modernization.43 With a spike in economic growth from 2001 to 2005 and a desire to 
replace dilapidated capabilities, Vietnam increased the pace and scope of force 
modernization.44 A senior defense official for Vietnam claimed that continued growth 
meant continued force modernization.45 This focus is not due to China’s rise but to 
                                                 
37 Torode, “Vietnam’s Military Growth Raising Eyebrows in Region.” 
38 Wendell Minnick, “Asia’s Naval Procurement Sees Major Growth,” Defense News, May 19, 2013, 
http://Army.defensenews.com/article/20130519/DEFREG03/3051 90004/Asia-s-Naval-Procurement-Sees-
Major-Growth. 
39 Minnick, “Asia’s Naval Procurement.“ 
40 Tung Nguyen Vu, “Vietnam’s Security Challenges: Vietnam’s New Approach to National Security 
and Implications to Defense and Foreign Policies,” 2010, 107–22. 




44 Australia Defense Intelligence Organization (DIO), “Vietnam,” Defense Economic Trends in the 
Asia-Pacific (2014): 28–29. 
45  Vu, “Vietnam’s Security Challenges,” 107–22. 
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Vietnam’s. They have the ability and funds to modernize, and taking advantage of 
economic growth is logical. Karniol explains that Vietnam’s newer acquisitions entail 
growing pains.46 In purchasing maritime patrol aircraft and submarines, Vietnam requires 
a solid naval doctrine to incorporate new capabilities. While Vietnam is adding 
equipment, a transition into an effective force is not automatic.47 Karniol adds, “Force 
modernization phased over time allows for the easier digestion of new capabilities, 
whereas the Vietnam People’s Army appears set on a hurried meal.”48 This aspect 
appears tied to economic growth and Vietnam’s drive to be modernized by 2020. 
Tung Nguyen Vu promotes this hypothesis too, arguing that modernization is 
included in a broader defense policy excluding the deterrence of China.49 Vietnam has 
maintained this attitude since the introduction of the Doi Moi reforms in 1986, 
reinforcing similar policy in 2004 and 2009 defense papers.50 Vietnam’s economic 
growth has enabled it to expand its defense budget, hoping to continue developing “a 
strong economy, just-enough national defense capability, and expanded international 
relations.”51 Tung argues that force modernization is not about an arms race or 
contingency.52 Rather, upgrading capabilities is tied to what economic conditions allow 
and what abilities generally help defend the coast and maritime zones.53 Military 
acquisitions are thus included in a broader defense policy that includes regional and 
global cooperation.54 The 2009 defense white paper indicated Vietnam’s desire to expand 
defense diplomacy beyond its current footprint that included defense relations with 65 
                                                 
46 Karniol, “Too Much, Too Soon?” 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49  Vu, “Vietnam’s Security Challenges,” 107–22. 
50 Ibid. 





countries and attaché offices in 31 countries, viewing this as essential for regional peace 
and stability.55  
China’s behavior in the SCS has motivated Vietnam’s push for military 
modernization, but Vietnam’s economic performance has enabled it and driven the 
country to boost its defense industry with help from international partners. Therefore, this 
explanation leans away from attributing military modernization in Vietnam primarily to 
China’s rise. In Shadows and Wind: A View of Modern Vietnam, Robert Templer writes, 
“The fear of domination has been constant and has crossed every ideological gap; it has 
created the brittle sense of anxiety and defensiveness about Vietnamese identity.”56 
Clearly, Vietnam has a fear of Chinese aggression and competes with China over 
maritime claims; however, with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand 
emphasizing submarine capabilities, Vietnam’s interest falls in line with regional 
modernization trends.57 The Kilos are included in Vietnam’s overall desire to become a 
modernized force, because its economy can allow it. Modern and effective militaries have 
submarines so Vietnam is emphasizing this capability.  
IHS Jane’s proposes both hypotheses mentioned previously as reasons for military 
modernization in Vietnam but avoids aligning with one cause. Jane’s analyst Jon Grevatt 
notes, “In January 2007 a Vietnam decree declared a 10-year programme to develop its 
maritime interests at all levels in order to protect the country’s sovereignty and strategic 
economic growth…the procurement of these submarines was central to this plan.”58 The 
2007 policy was declared prior to a Chinese submarine arriving and establishing 
residence at Sonya Naval Base on Hainan Island. Additionally, Grevatt stresses that the 
acquisitions allow Vietnam to compete in the submarine arms race developing in the 
region, giving it a deterrent against Washington and Beijing.59 Lacking well-trained 
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forces to operate platforms, Vietnam is drastically behind both countries in terms of 
submarine capabilities and general effectiveness. Vietnam might be unable to practice 
deterrence and harm relations with Beijing or Washington, the former serving as 
Vietnam’s greatest import market and the latter its greatest export market.60 
Vietnam is expanding diplomatic ties and emphasizing naval and air force 
capabilities, because the country wants to progress and reach a new modern status by 
2020. Vietnam has sought to increase relations with a variety of powers including China, 
because the country realizes the stabilizing effects of the policy. Less concerned with 
countering China in the SCS, Vietnam wants to become further intertwined in the 
international community. Vietnam’s drive to be a modern industrialized nation by 2020 
includes defense modernization, because international partners can offer their expertise in 
building a stronger Vietnam defense industry. Vietnam spent decades building a 
formidable army and still maintains significant active duty and reserve force. Land 
disputes though, have diminished in importance and the maritime region now dominates 
Vietnam’s focus. This shift, as well as partners participating in its capacity-building, is 
best illustrated by the Vietnam’s expanding UAV and shipbuilding industries.61  
3. Implications of Military Modernization in Vietnam 
Vietnam’s increased emphasis on military modernization has potential for 
destabilization, because China’s window to act aggressively toward claimants might be 
closing. China is monitoring Vietnam’s every move, worrying that increased capabilities 
will facilitate bellicosity by Vietnam.62 As Vietnam modernizes its force and increases 
ties with a variety of non-ASEAN actors, Vietnam’s confidence in confronting China in 
the SCS could increase. Vietnam has revealed to the international community and 
ASEAN that it is not afraid of confronting China, the smaller country bloodying China’s 
nose in a 1979 border war.63 In 2010, in response to incidents with the Chinese near the 
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Spratly Islands, the CPV reaffirmed its claims in the SCS and ordered live-firing naval 
exercises off the coast of central Vietnam.64China has a window of opportunity before 
Vietnam truly acquires capabilities that “could make further Chinese attempts to control 
all of the South China Sea expensive and dangerous.”65 It behooves China to be 
aggressive before Vietnam can project a possibly effective deterrent capability. As 
history reveals, China’s actions can surely provoke a Vietnamese response, causing a 
destabilized environment.  
The implications of force modernization are also destabilizing, because China 
views Vietnam’s increased security relations as threatening its sovereignty. Vietnam’s 
ties with other countries have already caused a destabilized environment that could 
increase in tension. Vietnam has increased relations with the United States in a possible 
effort to balance against China.66 Additionally, Vietnam continues to foster increased ties 
with India. Vietnam has likely increased security relations, because China has rebuffed 
calls for discussion and dispute management.67 China’s decision to place an oil rig inside 
Vietnam’s EEZ came days after a visit by President Obama to Asia in which he 
denounced the use of aggressiveness and coercion in settling territorial claims.68 While 
this move may have been aimed at revealing Washington’s inability to significantly deter 
China’s actions in the SCS, it nonetheless occurred as countries like Vietnam warm to an 
increased U.S. presence in Asia.69 In 2011 and possibly as a result of their increased 
security relationship, India and Vietnam signed an agreement to allow Indian oil 
exploration in the SCS, the deal following a tense confrontation between a Chinese 
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warship and the INS Avarat months prior.70 Thayer writes, “At the moment, Vietnam 
appears to be considering two strategies to deter China—leveraging United States 
alliance relationships with Japan and the Philippines and, in the case of armed hostilities, 
mutually assured destruction.”71 Vietnam is preparing for a destabilized environment, but 
these very actions are likely provoking China into acting assertively before Vietnam can 
truly deter it. China has historically reasoned that its assertive behavior is due to 
perceived attacks from other SCS claimants—Vietnam and the Philippines.72  
 Vietnam’s endeavors to increase security relationships in an effort to balance 
against China have possibly been overblown. Vietnam’s relations with India reveal a 
longstanding political relationship spanning more than six decades. While India has 
attempted to strengthen Vietnam’s military to deter China from naval operations in the 
Indian Ocean, Vietnam likely only welcomed the Indians to diversify its relations in the 
international environment and lessen its dependence on Russia.73 Revealing that any 
balancing posture is absent from Vietnam’s strategy towards China, David Brewster 
argues that Vietnam has a tradition of showing deference to China.74 Depending on 
China’s behavior though, Vietnam’s deference can shift quickly to confrontation. 
Vietnam began relations with India for economic reasons but has received little growth-
related support, New Delhi additionally proving to be an unreliable arms supplier 
overall.75 While India has sought to increase its security development in Southeast Asia, 
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Vietnam has been less concerned for security and more focused on economic 
development and showing some deference to China.76  
CPV force modernization could also lead to a stabilizing environment, because an 
increase in security ties and capabilities may diminish efforts by the Chinese to assert its 
sovereignty. Vietnam has sought to diversify its international relations since the seventh 
party congress of 1991.77 This drive has most recently been portrayed by Vietnam’s lean 
towards Washington, Tokyo, and Manila. Vietnam likely seeks to deter china enough that 
it would have to accept the current situation or escalate and possibly risk confrontation 
with the United States.78 Vietnam has no security alliance with Washington comparable 
to U.S. agreements with Japan or the Philippines, but as Vietnam continues ties with 
Washington, China may feel less prone to act provocatively in the SCS. Furthermore, 
China knows that in Vietnam, it faces an increasingly capable adversary. Vietnam’s 
emphasis on force modernization has increased its capability to a stage where it cannot 
match the Chinese but can inflict some damage.  
Vietnam’s military modernization is also a potentially stabilizing factor, because 
it may force China to rethink confronting Vietnam and sacrificing economic and political 
relations with a fellow communist government. The countries are so economically linked 
that seeking stability behooves both countries. Ian Storey adds, “All of the parties—
indeed all countries in the Asia Pacific—have a common interest in maintaining peace 
and stability in the South China Sea and the free flow of maritime trade.”79 The present 
stage of mature asymmetry between Vietnam and China cannot revert back to hostile 
asymmetry because both countries have too much at stake.80 Economic relations have 
steadily expanded since 1991, China emerging as Vietnam’s leading trading partner in 
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2004.81 By 1991, China had one investment project in Vietnam, but currently, maintains 
over 950 projects.82 While China’s economic reforms started almost a decade before 
Vietnam’s, China views Vietnam as a model for progressive political reform in the area 
of general secretary elections, for example.83 Prominent Chinese authors point to the 
CPV as evolving in the correct manner.84 The Chinese public appears to hold more of an 
aggressive posture towards the United States than Vietnam, and the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) obviously monitors progressive moves made by the CPV. Vietnam’s force 
modernization enables the country to be taken more seriously by the CCP. It is possible 
that the CCP is monitoring the CPV, because it senses in Vietnam a country that is not far 
from displaying a similar rise in the regional environment. It behooves China to maintain 
ties and prevent escalation in the SCS, because it will require free and navigable sea-
lanes due to its increasing energy requirements. Confronting an evolving and improving 
Vietnamese maritime force jeopardizes sea trade and energy security.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
In explaining Vietnam’s military modernization program, this thesis seeks to 
present Vietnam’s general defense initiatives since 1986. Using historical analysis, it 
explains the plans and acquisitions leading to Vietnam’s increased military capabilities. 
This thesis draws on official CPV documents including defense white papers, which 
reveal intentions behind modernization. Furthermore, this thesis relies on secondary 
sources such as scholarly literature and policy analysis from leading think tanks.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Focusing on Vietnam’s military modernization, this thesis includes the following 
three chapters: details of modernization, causes of modernization, and closing thoughts. 
The details chapter will illustrate Vietnam’s efforts to modernize militarily, explaining its 
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focus and intensions. The next chapter will explore causes behind Vietnam’s military 
modernization, diminishing the hypothesis that attributes much of Vietnam’s increased 
capabilities to China’s influence. Attempting to ease concerns of major conflict in the 
SCS, the final chapter will assess both the hypotheses behind modernization and the 
implications of these findings for regional security.   
 18 
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II. THE DETAILS OF MILITARY MODERNIZATION IN 
VIETNAM 
Since the initiation of economic reforms in the late 1980s, the Vietnam People’s 
Army (VPA) has increased its sea and air capabilities while also enhancing foreign 
defense relations. During the early to mid-1980s, Vietnam’s strategic environment called 
for a strong ground force presence in Cambodia, Laos, and at its border with China. At 
that time, Vietnam relied almost completely on Soviet aid and equipment. By 1990, the 
CPV had withdrawn most forces from these hot-spots and adopted non-provocative 
policies, helping ease regional tension. By the mid-1990s and as a result of Vietnam’s 
increasing focus on its economy and offshore territory, it decided to pursue policy and 
acquisitions geared more toward the maritime environment. Since then, military 
capabilities outside of Vietnam’s ground forces have increased with the addition of more 
modern equipment. After the Soviet Union’s collapse, Vietnam expanded its military 
procurement network and general defense policy beyond Russia. Since 1986, Vietnam 
has continued to improve its capabilities through targeted acquisitions, and it has focused 
increasingly on striking defense agreements across the international community.85 
A. EVOLUTION OF FORCES AND PROCUREMENTS 
Since the late-1980s, CPV leaders have focused on boosting navy, air force, and 
coast guard capabilities while reducing the country’s ground forces by over half. Notable 
improvements in Vietnam’s maritime defense include more capable navy ships and 
locally-built equipment for the coast guard. Though most maritime roles are now shared 
with or have been assumed by the navy, the air force has received updated fighter aircraft 
and awaits the possible introduction of UAV capabilities to its order of battle. Though it 
received the most funding and political priority in the 1980s, the ground force has 
weakened considerably due to outdated equipment and less personnel. With the exception 
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of the ground force, each service branch has improved significantly over the almost 25-
year period.86  
1. Vietnam People’s Navy  
Given that offshore territory became a higher priority for the CPV after 1986, 
Vietnam has since strengthened its navy by adding more capable equipment.87 Vietnam’s 
economy began to rebound in the early to mid-1990s, and the CPV diverted funds toward 
strengthening SCS defense capabilities.88 Policy makers had economic interests in the 
SCS and understood that their strategic environment had changed. In the wake of Doi 
Moi, they realized that their ability to defend offshore territory was lacking 
considerably.89 The navy has since added more capable frigates and patrol craft, 
purchased submarines, absorbed an air wing, and developed local shipbuilding.90 Its 
capabilities still lag behind those of other regional neighbors including Singapore, China, 
Taiwan, and Indonesia, but with better equipment, it has evolved into a more capable 
force with the potential to become one of ASEAN’s top navies.91 
Specifically, Vietnam’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) has sought to improve the 
navy’s frigate fleet. In 1986, the navy only had eight light frigates, including six 1,150-
ton Petya-class ships—smaller than the average frigate.92 In 2006, defense leaders 
ordered two 2,100-ton Gepard-class guided missile frigates to replace the Petya-class 
frigates as the navy’s principal surface combatants.93 The navy received the Russian-
                                                 
86 Paragraph details pulled directly from IHS Jane’s, “Vietnam > Procurement.” 
87 Thayer, Vietnam People’s Army, 41. 
88 Ibid., 36. 
89 Ibid., 41. 
90 “IHS Jane’s - Vietnam > Navy,” August 19, 2014, https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Custom 
Pages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=Reference&ItemId=+++1305175&Pubabbrev=SEA; “IHS Jane’s 




92 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1986 (London: IISS, 1986), 136–
137. 
93 IHS Jane’s, “Vietnam > Procurement.” 
 21 
made Gepard frigates in 2010 and commissioned them in 2011, subsequently ordering 
two more with anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities to be delivered in 2017.94 The 
navy still operates the Petya frigates, but a defense periodical currently classifies them 
under corvettes or patrol and coastal combatants.95 By adding the Gepard-class frigates, 
Vietnam now has principal surface combatants capable of power projection, and these 
ships “will be the backbone of its navy for the foreseeable future.”96 Once the navy 
receives the fourth Gepard frigate, this force should be capable of engaging air, surface, 
and subsurface threats while “providing an important layer in an area-access area denial 
(A2/AD)” strategy.97  
The navy has removed older, less capable patrol boats and increased its number of 
corvettes and patrol ships. Today, the Vietnamese Navy maintains close to 70 patrol and 
coastal combatants compared to 110 in 1986.98 This decrease could be attributed to the 
navy simply removing older, less capable craft from the South Vietnam era and focusing 
more on blue-water capabilities. Defense leaders ordered the near 500-ton BPS-500 
corvette in 1996, and it became the first ship to be built inside the country.99 Taruntal-
class ships—close to 500 tons—and Petya light frigates dominate the remaining supply of 
corvettes.100 Initiating orders in 1995 and continuing into 2004, the navy currently 
operates eight Taruntal-class corvettes and should receive six additional craft once 
construction is complete.101 Additionally, the navy has ordered four 2,100-ton Sigma 
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corvettes from the Netherlands.102 Generally smaller than the Taruntal corvette and more 
similar to a patrol boat, Patrol Combat Corvettes (PCC) became a part of the navy’s fleet 
beginning in 2002.103 The navy received 375-ton Svetlyak-class ships beginning in 2002, 
and Vietnam shipbuilders delivered 480-ton TT-400TP ships beginning in 2011.104 PCCs 
now include six Svetlyak and three TT-400TP craft.105 The navy has 34 smaller patrol 
boats, including 13 torpedo and missile-capable craft.106 Focusing on larger, more 
capable frigates and corvettes since 1986, the navy has decreased its number of patrol 
boats as the coast guard has mostly assumed their mission.  
Vietnam’s navy has only slightly increased its amphibious craft and 
minesweeping units. As for amphibious craft, the navy had seven landing ships and 20 
smaller landing craft around the Doi Moi reforms.107 In 2014, the navy maintains eight 
landing ships and 30 landing craft.108 Minesweeping units became a fleet component in 
1987 with 12 mine-countermeasure craft.109 Today, this unit totals 13 craft.110 
Amphibious and minesweeping capabilities are important for the navy but receive less 
attention and equipment due to their unique missions. 
The navy’s submarine acquisitions have been among the most notable 
procurements for Vietnam. In 1998, the navy added two 100-ton Yugo-class midget 
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submarines from North Korea; however, these craft are largely inoperable.111 In 2009, 
the Vietnamese struck a deal with Moscow to acquire six Kilo-class submarines with a 
displacement of 3,000 to 3,950 tons.112 By the end of 2014, the navy will have received 
three of the submarines and expects to have all six in country by 2016.113 Once 
operational, Vietnam’s Kilos—carrying quieter and more efficient diesel engines—will 
be some of the most modern, updated submarines in the region.114 Regional diplomats 
claim that two Kilos have been spotted conducting training cruises near the Cam Ranh 
Bay port, while a separate Vietnamese crew trains onboard the third Kilo near the coast 
of St. Petersburg, Russia.115 Vietnam has moved quickly to train crews for the new 
submarines, but the overall effectiveness of the force remains to be seen.116 Acquiring 
submarine capabilities is important for Vietnam, and these will be highly advanced 
platforms requiring highly trained sailors. 
MOD established a navy air wing in 2012 after the air force relinquished control 
of most maritime aircraft.117 Helix helicopters were first delivered to the air force in 1999 
but now provide the bulk of the navy’s air wing.118 The navy now operates with 10 Ka-
28 Helix A and two Ka-32 Helix C aircraft.119 Those numbers have remained steady 
since 2001, excluding three Ka-25 Helix aircraft retired in 2013.120 To boost maritime 
patrol capabilities, defense officials ordered six DHC-6 Twin Otter light airplanes in 
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2010 and two EC225 rotary wing aircraft in 2012.121 One of each platform is now 
attached to the navy air wing.122 Prior to the DHC-6, Vietnam ordered 10 M-28 Skytruck 
patrol airplanes in 2005 and planned for a dozen more—one is currently operational.123 
Vietnam desires to purchase non-lethal P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) from 
the United States, but discussions are still ongoing.124 Using mostly rotary wing aircraft, 
the navy air wing has established roles in anti-submarine warfare and search and rescue, 
while also increasing maritime patrol capabilities to monitor territorial waters. 
a. Navy Analysis 
For the Vietnamese Navy, submarines are the most important acquisition to date, 
because the equipment provides the force its first genuine deterrent capability.125 While 
the Gepard-class frigates and Taruntal-class corvettes “have the ability to be quick strike 
vessels…and deliver devastating blows to enemy vessels,” the navy’s Kilos are essential 
to Vietnam’s pursuit of an A2/AD strategy.126 The navy’s MPA increases the military’s 
ability to monitor territorial waters, but while important, these aircraft do not cause China 
to question its behavior compared to the influence of submarines. Ankit Panda argues that 
the acquisitions could alter the imbalance between the countries, because China lacks 
effective ASW capabilities and fears “defending against an adversary with advanced 
surface ships and submarines.”127 Vietnam’s diesel-electric Kilos could force China to 
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rethink deploying vessels into disputed waters, and for the CPV, this A2/AD strategy is 
the best way to counter assertive behavior.128 For this reason, the CPV’s pursuit of 
submarines is currently the most important naval development. 
While the navy’s mission potential has been strengthened with the addition of 
submarines and advanced surface vessels, this force requires more time to sufficiently 
monitor its waters and “project naval power into the SCS.”129 For now, the navy’s 
operational capability is relatively weak, because “spares are in short supply and many 
ships can lay only a tentative claim to operational capability.130 Nguyen Hung Son adds, 
“The current fleet is considered far too small, slow and old for its duties.”131 To mitigate 
these issues, the CPV has prioritized upgrading its navy with the introduction of 
submarines and newer frigates, corvettes, and patrol craft; however, while this equipment 
may yield a stronger force, “the acquisition of some sophisticated platform or system 
does not necessarily translate into an effective capability.”132 Additionally, Chinese 
military researchers assess weaknesses in Vietnam’s operating experience with advanced 
systems in addition to targeting, surveillance, and battle management.133 Vietnam’s 
submarines have the potential to deter China in the SCS, but the systems require highly 
trained crews and an efficient maintenance capacity.134 For these reasons, a truly reliable, 
capable submarine force may take decades to achieve.135 The VPN is capable of 
conducting constant patrols of contested waters and its infantry wing has become the 
country’s rapid response force.136 With the addition of submarines and aviation assets, 
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the navy is now a three-dimensional force.137 Vietnam’s 2009 defense white paper claims 
that the navy can “effectively conduct search-and-rescue operations.”138 In the paper, 
defense leaders recognize that newer equipment will enhance their ability to protect 
Vietnam’s sovereignty.139 For the navy to respond to multiple threats along its coastline 
or EEZ, continued investment along with a more developed naval doctrine will be 
necessary.140  
Vietnam’s capabilities are becoming among the strongest in ASEAN, and the 
country’s modernization efforts mirror regional trends.141 In 1986, the Vietnamese Navy 
operated with no submarines, air wing, or principal surface combatants. The government 
has focused on increasing naval capabilities, and they have made adequate strides in 
doing so. Currently, the VPN receives $706 million USD for expenditures compared to 
the air force’s $628 million and the army’s $366 million; IHS Jane’s assesses the value of 
naval expenditures to increase.142 Vietnam has joined Singapore, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia as ASEAN’s best navies. Regarding submarines, Thayer expects Vietnam’s 
force to fall “somewhere between that of Singapore and Indonesia.”143 Additionally, 
some analysts believe that Vietnam’s new submarines outclass China’s Kilos.144 
Singapore and Indonesia maintain more robust capabilities in terms of naval aviation, but 
Vietnam’s Gepard-class frigates will likely outperform Indonesia’s and rival 
Singapore’s.145 Regarding trends, Bob Nugent writes, “In Malaysia and Indonesia…each 
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country continues to focus on developing indigenous shipbuilding infrastructure, and 
each has plans to acquire numbers of frigates and corvettes that will enhance current 
mission capability in surface and submarine warfare to their navies.”146 Similar to 
Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia have committed to submarine technology 
and its associated infrastructure.147 Vietnam’s capabilities have advanced considerably, 
and the country is not alone in its desire to modernize naval capabilities.  
The PLAN maintains a considerable advantage over the VPN in terms of size and 
capabilities. Located in Guangdong Province, China’s South Sea Fleet includes “nine 
coastal defense districts, with approximately 320 ships.”148 This fleet maintains over 20 
submarines and has four air divisions divided among fighters, bombers, and 
helicopters.149 In any naval clash against China, Vietnam will clearly be outnumbered. 
CPV leadership understands that China’s naval capabilities far surpass its own; therefore, 
leaders have acquired capabilities to enhance an A2/AD strategy.150 If successful in 
developing, maintaining, and operating certain capabilities, the VPN can potentially deter 
China in the SCS.  
2. Vietnam People’s Air Force  
As a result of an increased focus to strengthen air and sea capabilities beginning 
after Doi Moi, the Vietnam Peoples Air Force (VPAF) has evolved into a larger, more 
capable branch due to necessary updates in fighter aircraft and air defense.151 In 1986, the 
VPAF comprised of 15,000 members, 270 combat aircraft, and 65 combat helicopters.152 
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Today, the total of air force members has doubled due to Vietnam’s air defense force 
merging with the air force at the turn of the century.153 Combat aircraft has decreased to 
97, but the CPV has acquired better capabilities since 1986.154 As defense leaders have 
emphasized boosting fighter aircraft, Vietnam’s attack helicopter fleet has received fewer 
updates.155 Newer missiles have arrived with newer fighter aircraft though, and 
Vietnam’s air defense force has boosted its surface to air missile (SAM) inventory.156 
More recently, Vietnam has begun to research and develop an unmanned capability to 
further strengthen its air force.157 VPAF looks different today than it did almost 25 years 
ago, because leaders have acquired better fixed wing aircraft, air defense capabilities, and 
emphasized a UAV focus.  
At a more detailed level, the most notable procurements for VPAF have been 
fixed wing aircraft. After 1986, Vietnam decided to pursue more capabilities to defend 
maritime interests.158 Before the Doi Moi reforms, variants of the MiG-21 dominated the 
VPAF’s inventory. Adding to an order of battle already full of 1970-era aircraft, the Su-
20/-22 fighter also flew for the VPAF in 1986.159 Notable improvements to fighter 
aircraft began in 1995. At this time, defense officials ordered 12 fixed wing aircraft: six 
1980-era Su-27 Flankers to assume combat roles and six older MiG-21UM aircraft for 
training purposes.160 Between 1995 and 1998, the air force added additional Su-27s, and 
analysts assess 11 as currently operational.161 In 2003, Vietnam ordered four 1990-era 
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Su-30 Flankers with an option for eight additional aircraft.162 The 2003 orders arrived in 
2005 and the option occurred in 2009 as an addition to the groundbreaking submarine 
transaction.163 Presently, analysts assess that 23 Su-30 Flankers are operational.164 The 
addition of Su-30 aircraft has improved VPAF’s order of battle, but more are necessary to 
completely replace older MiG aircraft less capable of modern missions.  
 The air force has decreased rotary wing aircraft but increased its air defense 
capabilities. As for attack helicopters, air force personnel currently operate with 26 Mi-24 
Hind aircraft compared to 30 in 1986.165 The air force lost ASW-capable helicopters to 
the navy in 2012.166 Unfortunately for the air force, rotary wing upgrades have largely 
been reserved for boosting maritime patrol capabilities for the navy and coast guard. In 
1986, the air defense force operated 60 different sites with various towed SAMs 
including the SA-2 Guideline and SA-3 Goa.167 In 1993, this force gained six sites and 
added the self-propelled SA-6 Gainful.168 Beginning in 2000, the air defense force 
included man-portable, shoulder-fired SA-7 Grail and SA-16 Gimlet SAMs in its order of 
battle and in 2012, added the self-propelled SA-20 Gargoyle.169 Beginning in 2001, the 
air defense force merged with VPAF and increased its numbers to 30,000.170 The air 
defense force has maintained over 60 sites since the early 1990s and strengthened its 
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firepower, increasing SAM variants from two to six.171 Though the navy assumed much 
of VPAF’s ASW and patrolling aircraft, the air force still maintains capable attack 
helicopters as well as overall air defense units. 
 The last notable development includes Vietnam’s emerging interest in UAV 
capabilities, which appears to have developed after 2010.172 State-owned defense 
institutions including the Vietnam Aerospace Association (VASA) and Viettel Group 
have spearheaded UAV development in country; the former group struck a collaborative 
deal with foreign firms in 2012.173 Sending personnel and technology to Vietnam for co-
development and production of tailored assets, Russia’s Irkut and Sweden’s Unmanned 
Systems Group (UMS) have begun working alongside VASA members.174 The Russian 
firm plans to model the Vietnamese asset after its Irkut-200, which has a 12-hour 
endurance, 745-mile range, and wingspan of 21 feet.175 The Swedish platform will likely 
perform under half the endurance and range of the Irkut model.176 The Viettel Group 
unveiled the country’s first UAV earlier this year after beginning development in 
2011.177 Viettel’s UAV appears comparable in size and performance to Boeing’s 
ScanEagle. Jane’s assesses that Vietnam currently maintains six Viettel UAVs, but 
information regarding their operational status is unavailable.178 While it is unclear at this 
time which service will own the emerging UAV platforms, the air force will likely be 
involved in their employment and the capability will surely enhance Vietnam’s ability to 
monitor its coast and offshore territory.  
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a. Air Force Analysis 
The VPAF’s most important developments include upgraded Sukhoi fighter 
aircraft and the pending introduction of UAV capabilities. The majority of the VPAF’s 
fighter inventory still includes the Su-22 and MiG-21.179 It has been critical for VPAF 
leadership to pursue newer fighters, because the aforementioned aircraft are nearing end 
of service.180 Acquiring Su-30 fighters has been vital to modernize this force, provide a 
more capable aircraft for ensuring sovereignty over SCS features, and help Vietnam 
“understand the technology of the same jet fighter as China is manufacturing under 
license.”181 Though still a developing sector, UAV capabilities can provide the VPAF—
or the VPN depending on allocation—a cheaper intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) option compared to MPA aircraft. With UAVs, the VPAF can 
extend its abilities to monitor contested areas, potentially acquiring valuable enemy force 
characteristics.  
Regarding mission potential, the VPAF is capable of adequate close air support 
and partial air superiority.182 The newer Sukhoi fighters have improved the VPAF’s 
inventory, but this force is untested and requires greater numbers and investment.183 
These fighters are capable of reaching the Spratly Islands and potentially competing for 
air superiority against China, because “China is not particularly strong in the domain of 
aerial refueling.”184 Additionally, the effective range of China’s aircraft combined with 
their distance from available airfields causes concern for PRC leadership, though the 
PRC is inching closer toward establishing an airfield at the Spratlys.185 An emphasis on 
UAVs may result in Vietnam establishing a credible unmanned presence for the air force, 
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but these capabilities are still developing. Overall, the VPAF needs more capable fighters 
to completely fulfill its mission potential, and “the question is how they manage to 
balance that qualitative improvement with the need for fighter numbers, as the MiGs and 
Su-22s age out.”186  
Overall, VPAF’s capabilities still trail leading members of ASEAN and China, 
but its gradual modernization has certainly improved what was an outdated and neglected 
branch.187 After Doi Moi, Vietnam leaders understood that updating its air force required 
greater emphasis, and its aging order of battle received newer, more capable platforms 
beginning in 1995.188 Removing or retiring older MiG and Su-22 aircraft and replacing 
them with more capable, modern aircraft was and still should remain a priority for 
Vietnamese leaders. Jane’s assesses the VPAF as lagging behind Singapore and Thailand 
in terms of combat capability, though Indonesia and Malaysia likely surpass the VPAF’s 
abilities too.189 Compared to Vietnam, these countries have sought upgraded capabilities 
as well. Malaysia and Indonesia have procured Sukhoi fighter aircraft and all four have 
benefited from Boeing and Lockheed Martin equipment.190 Compared to China, the 
VPAF is extremely outmatched. The strength of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force 
(PLAAF) is close to 400,000 personnel compared to 30,000 in Vietnam; China has 59 air 
combat regiments while Vietnam has nine.191 China clearly maintains a more robust air 
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capability, and if conflict were to ignite between the countries, Vietnam must hope for 
action at the distant Spratly Archipelago, which will challenge the PLAAF’s range.192  
3. Vietnam Coast Guard  
During the past 16 years, Vietnam’s Coast Guard (VCG) has assumed a more 
prominent role, strengthened its capabilities, and changed its name.193 In September 
1998, the defense ministry created the Vietnam Marine Police to enforce maritime laws 
across the navy’s five regions.194 Overall, the younger force operates with more modern 
equipment than the other services due to the government’s emphasis on boosting 
maritime strength. This modernization has enabled it to expand patrols and increase its 
confidence in confronting maritime threats. The force has benefitted from Vietnam’s 
recent shipbuilding interest, because it has received newer, locally produced patrol 
boats.195 Additionally, this force has received an increase in aviation support since orders 
began in 2005.196 In 2013, the Vietnam Marine Police became the Vietnam Coast Guard 
in order to align with international norms and increase collaboration with other regional 
coast guards.197 The coast guard has evolved from operating a handful of former navy 
torpedo boats to having air support and tailored patrol craft capable of confronting 
offshore threats and monitoring Vietnam’s coast.198  
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The VCG operates with over 35 maritime vessels, receiving most of its equipment 
from local shipyards between 2000 and 2010.199 Prior to 2000, the coast guard received 
handed down equipment from the navy and retrofitted it to suit its needs—several Soviet-
era Shershen-class torpedo craft, for example.200 With design help from Russian defense 
firms and local shipbuilder ShipTech, the coast guard received close to 26 indigenously-
produced 44-meter, 200-ton TT-200 and 35-meter, 120-ton TT-120 patrol boats from 
2000 to 2010.201 In 2012 and after an order for four 90-meter offshore patrol vessels, the 
Damen Shipyards Group from the Netherlands and Hai Phong-based 189 Shipbuilding 
Company collaboratively produced the coast guard’s most modern ship to date.202 
Operating with a range of 5,000 nautical miles, a displacement of 2,400 tons, and a rear 
flight deck, the DN2000 enhances the coast guard’s ability to monitor its maritime 
environment and provides it a more versatile capability due to potential flight 
operations.203 Using designs from Russia’s Marine Technology Development, Hong Ha 
Shipbuilding Company unveiled the 54-meter, 400-ton TT-400TP patrol vessel in 2011 
and has since added three to its inventory.204 In 2013, South Korea provided the coast 
guard with older patrol vessels, and in 2014, Japan announced that it would provide 
Vietnam six fishing vessels for shipbuilders to convert for the coast guard.205 The coast 
guard has increased its fleet to include modern patrol craft and will likely continue to 
receive added capabilities with help from local shipbuilders and the government’s—as 
well as foreign partner’s—emphasis on its maritime defense. 
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VCG has also benefitted from an increase in maritime aviation assets.206 From 
2012 to 2013, three C-212-400 MPA arrived and became the coast guard’s primary 
maritime support asset.207 In mid-2013, Vietnam established a combined air force and 
navy brigade, operating the C-212 on behalf of the coast guard.208 MOD has emphasized 
acquiring a strong maritime patrol capability, and it is likely that this new air brigade will 
also utilize navy and air force-owned MPA including EC225 and Mi-8/-17 helicopters as 
well as DHC-6 and M28 airplanes.209 The coast guard has also begun to explore the 
acquisition of new helicopters for its DN2000 patrol craft, which carries a flight deck.210 
With the introduction of newer patrol aircraft, the air force-navy air component, and the 
possibility of helicopters for newer ships, the coast guard is now able to extend its 
maritime monitoring capabilities. 
The coast guard recently received funds to boost its capabilities and will also 
benefit from a new Fisheries Surveillance Force (FSF), because this force can help 
expand the coast guard’s monitoring capability.211 After the coast guard’s name change 
in 2013, Vietnam’s MOD announced that VCG funding would “be sourced from the state 
budget under a separate item allocated to the MOD,” suggesting that the VCG’s 
modernization and activity would not fall under Vietnam’s defense budget.212 In June 
2014, Vietnam’s government approved a $747 million USD plan to boost maritime 
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capabilities.213 These funds appear to be channeling toward the VCG and the newly 
formed FSF under the government’s Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, 
which is an entity created to police fishing practices at sea.214 In August 2014, Vietnam 
passed legislation to authorize weapons onboard over 50 FSF vessels by September 2014, 
including explosives, handguns, and 14.5 mm machine guns.215 Among the FSF’s five 
missions, it is tasked with “contributing to security order and national sovereignty in 
Vietnam’s maritime area.”216 This mission overlaps with the VCG’s mission of enforcing 
maritime law, and both forces worked in coordination to confront Chinese forces during 
the May 2014 oil rig standoff.217 The CPV intends to create a formidable coast guard, 
and by investing in a FSF, the coast guard can benefit from another force that expands its 
maritime capabilities. 
a. Coast Guard Analysis 
For the VCG, the most important acquisitions have been the DN2000 offshore 
patrol vessel and C-212-400 MPA. The DN2000 is an important acquisition, because it 
provides the VCG a principal vessel, which can maintain naval helicopters and 
coordinate with MPA. Prior to the DN2000, the VCG only operated with smaller patrol 
craft incapable of flight operations. The DN2000 has the characteristics of a frigate. It is 
slightly over 10 meters shorter than the navy’s new Gepard frigates but has a greater 
displacement and range.218 The DN2000 is also important, because Vietnam’s defense 
industry helped co-produce the vessel with the Netherlands’ Damen Shipbuilding 
Group.219 Though not operating illustrations of Vietnam’s burgeoning defense industry, 
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the C-212-400 MPA are important acquisitions, because they are completely dedicated to 
the VCG.220 These aircraft help extend the VCG’s footprint and help accelerate the 
VCG’s response to maritime issues. 
Since 1998, the coast guard’s mission potential has improved considerably, but 
increased investment and a legitimate code of conduct are necessary to perform essential 
tasks and enforce maritime laws. Along Vietnam’s coastline and among its continental 
shelf and EEZ, the coast guard is tasked with the following missions: “drug smuggling, 
human trafficking, counter terrorism, industrial radioactive and toxic waste dumping, 
marine environmental protection, surveillance of illegal operations by foreign fishing 
vessels, maritime law enforcements, marine assistance, and search and rescue.”221 With 
its smallest ship at 120 tons and its largest at 2,500 tons, the VCG has close to 40 vessels, 
but more are necessary to enforce laws across the five regions of the VPN.222 Even with 
greater investment, it behooves Vietnam to continue pressing for a binding code of 
conduct in the SCS. A code of conduct could strengthen the coast guard’s ability to 
enforce maritime law in the SCS, because a legally binding agreement could potentially 
deter actors from behaving aggressively toward Vietnam.  
The VCG competes for one of ASEAN’s best coastal forces, and its development 
falls in line with regional trends.223 The VCG has improved since 1998 thanks to the 
evolution of Vietnam’s defense industry. Local shipbuilding firms have evolved to 
acquire the necessary skills to manufacture basic patrol craft, adding to the service’s 
inventory. Due to foreign collaboration and the government’s increased emphasis on the 
maritime environment, the coast guard has received the DN2000 and its own air assets.224 
No other ASEAN coast guard can boast ships comparable to the DN2000, because it is 
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larger and more versatile than the vessels leading ASEAN coast guards maintain.225 Sam 
Bateman writes, “Southeast Asian countries without coast guards are establishing them, 
and those that already had coastguards are expanding them.”226 The Asia-Pacific region 
is generally pursuing increased coast guard capabilities, because “coast guards are more 
suitable than navies for operations in disputed areas and for cooperation with neighboring 
countries to maintain good order at sea.”227 Compared to other regional forces, Vietnam 
maintains half the number of total vessels that Singapore and Malaysia operate, and 
Malaysia’s Coast Guard owns more dedicated air assets.228 Indonesia is capable of 
creating a preeminent coast guard, but the navy, shortfalls in capacity, and a lack of 
coordination between various maritime entities has stunted its development.229 Though 
the force still operates under the navy’s control, the Philippine Coast Guard has a long 
history but has suffered from decreased funding.230 Furthermore, Thailand’s coastal force 
is attached to its national police department, and the country has mostly revealed a lack of 
commitment to boost capabilities and re-structure maritime roles.231 Based on total 
dedicated equipment and investment, the VCG likely falls behind Singapore and 
Malaysia for ASEAN’s best coast guard; however, with increased investment and 
continued local defense industry production, the VCG will strengthen amid the region’s 
growing emphasis on “lawships over war ships.”232  
China’s capabilities in civil maritime enforcement far surpass Vietnam’s. China 
maintains five separate maritime law enforcement agencies, and two groups have 
dedicated air assets.233 In 2010, Lyle Goldstein outlined the agencies’ planning 
requirements for the SCS. Those plans included the following 132 vessels: four large 
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cutters greater than 3,500 tons, five midsize cutters greater than 1,500 tons, 43 small 
cutters greater than 500 tons, and 80 small boats greater than 100 tons.234 Comparably, 
the VCG has almost forty vessels and will eventually have four DN2000s at 2,500 
tons.235 The VCG is incredibly small compared to China’s coastal forces, but it is 
improving and competing for SEA’s most capable coast guard.  
4. Vietnam People’s Ground Forces 
The ground force has evolved in a different direction compared to Vietnam’s 
other military branches, suffering personnel cuts and scant updates in equipment. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union left Vietnam without a main defense partner. Losing a 
substantial amount of Soviet military aid, Vietnam adopted new defense practices, 
choosing to focus on strengthening services outside of ground forces. Issued in 1987 by 
the CPV Political Bureau, Resolution No. 2 demobilized 600,000 soldiers and today, the 
ground force totals 412,000. At the time of the resolution, the ground force included one 
million soldiers and ranked among the largest in the world, trailing only the Soviet 
Union, China, the United States, and India. Notably, Vietnam’s ground force has 
encountered minor insurgencies since 1986 but nothing comparable to foes faced prior to 
1986. Hampered by the loss of key defense suppliers and the government’s shifting 
defense priorities, the ground force has not improved and has received less equipment to 
boost capabilities.236  
Ground force procurements have been less than substantial, and the service 
continues to operate older equipment with fewer people.237 Procuring modern equipment 
for ground forces has been a low priority for Vietnamese leaders. Main Battle Tank 
(MBT) numbers have stayed relatively the same, with 1,270 MBTs today compared to 
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1,300 in 1994.238 With the newest T-62 beginning service for the Soviets in the sixties, 
Vietnam’s MBTs are extremely outdated. The 30-tank decrease in MBTs is attributed to 
the VPA eliminating the M-48A3 from their order of battle and essentially retiring the 
1940-era T-34. They have increased Light Battle Tanks (LBT) by 20, though these were 
initially produced in the 1960s.239 The most notable developments have been in Armored 
Personnel Carriers (APC) and organization.240 Defense leaders have added 200 U.S.-
made M113 APCs, the 1960-era equipment used heavily by the United States during the 
Vietnam War.241 With fewer ground forces in 2014, the VPA has sought to increase 
combat support and combat service support roles by establishing logistic, medical, 
training, electronic warfare, and signals responsibilities.242 The CPV has recently struck a 
deal with Israeli defense firms, placing a production facility inside Vietnam to 
manufacture the Galil 31/32 ACE assault rifle to eventually replace the army’s AK-47 
stockpile.243  
a. Ground Force Analysis 
There have been few important acquisitions for Vietnam’s ground force, and the 
force is less mission-capable due to less funding—a region-wide trend for ground forces. 
Since the 1980s, the ground force has received significantly less attention by the CPV. 
After land wars ended with China and the Khmer Rouge, ground force numbers 
decreased, pushing Vietnam out of the top five for largest standing armies. Since then, 
leaders have allocated defense funding toward boosting air and sea capabilities, which 
required significant modernization. Unlike the other services, Vietnam’s ground force 
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capabilities have weakened considerably since the 1980s. Though Jane’s assesses this 
ground force as resilient, it has not faced substantial conflict since 1989 and would likely 
be unable to thwart an invasion comparable to China’s intrusion in 1979. The army has 
little rapid response capability, and its mission has evolved to reflect an internal security 
force. At 410,000 members, Vietnam still maintains the largest standing army in SEA, 
while the closest ASEAN countries are Singapore at 350,000 and Indonesia at 300,000, 
respectively. For comparison, China’s army is at least triple the size of Vietnam’s. 
Including top ASEAN militaries and China, defense spending is increasingly aimed at 
improving air and maritime forces to secure offshore interests and develop maritime 
economies.244  
B. CHANGING RELATIONSHIP WITH INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE 
COMMUNITY 
After the Doi Moi reforms and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Vietnam chose to eliminate isolationist tendencies and pursue an omnidirectional foreign 
military defense strategy.245 The most notable increases in defense relations occurred in 
the 1990s and especially after 2007. Russia still dominates Vietnam’s procurement 
network, but Vietnam is beginning to acquire military equipment from places other than 
the former Soviet Union.246 Vietnam has made progress in diversifying defense suppliers 
and increasing defense ties with countries in nearly every continent. Outside of SEA, 
Vietnam has specifically increased ties with European countries to boost its defense 
industry, but this strategy extends to other countries too, including Canada, South Korea, 
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Japan, India, and the United States.247 For David Brewster, Vietnam’s pursuit of warmer 
relations with India and the United States began in 2001 as the new CPV general 
secretary re-emphasized a need to diversify international relations.248 In Vietnam, both 
countries find a partner eager to increase its defense capacity. The Indians and Americans 
are providing equipment and training for Vietnamese forces but also increasing their 
presence in Vietnam and off its coast. 
1. Procurement Sources 
Russia continues to be Vietnam’s primary arms supplier, but Vietnam has 
expanded its procurement network.249 The Soviet Union’s collapse caused a brief 
departure of warm defense relations between the countries, but beginning in 1995, 
Vietnam resumed notable defense deals with Russia, which have included frigates, 
corvettes, submarines, and fighter aircraft.250 Poland began selling aircraft to Vietnam in 
2003, including fighters but also MPA.251 Spain, Canada, and Romania have provided 
Vietnam MPA as well as training aircraft.252 The Netherlands has taken an active role in 
guiding Vietnam’s shipbuilding practices, helping provide new patrol ships for the 
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VCG.253 Sweden—along with Russia—has provided guidance and design for Vietnam’s 
new UAVs.254 Ukraine provided training aircraft in 2004 and has been a steady supplier 
for various equipment and parts since before 1986.255 The Czech Republic has sold spare 
parts and other defense equipment for Vietnam’s Soviet-era weaponry, and Israel recently 
established a production facility in Vietnam.256 Furthermore, Japan and South Korea 
have shown increased interest in boosting the VCG’s capabilities, and India has steadily 
increased its involvement in Vietnam’s defense sales since 2000.257 While Russia still 
provides the bulk of its defense equipment, Vietnam has received notable MPA and naval 
craft from other sources.258 Outside of lessening its dependency on Russia, Vietnam 
seeks diversified procurement deals, because they often lead to defense industry 
collaboration.259 This collaboration enables different countries to add their own particular 
strength to Vietnam’s burgeoning defense industry.  
2. Defense Ties 
Defense ties and general defense industry collaboration have expanded as 
Vietnam has sought memorandums of understanding (MOU) and strategic partnerships to 
progress beyond previous isolationist tendencies. Since 2007, Vietnam has established or 
advanced defense agreements with over 25 countries including Mozambique, Australia, 
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and countries across Europe, Asia, and the Americas.260 The agreements, most of which 
are defense-related MOUs, generally focus on increasing defense collaboration, arms 
sales, training, and military to military exchanges.261 Relations with India and the United 
States deserve attention, because they have rapidly improved since Doi Moi and 
especially since 2007.262 Vietnam has become a strategic priority for the countries, 
especially as China has grown more assertive in the SCS. Notable events between 
Vietnam and these two countries occurred in 2007, 2013, and 2014; their importance and 
the overall significance of closer ties are discussed below. Overall, Vietnam’s increase in 
relations falls in line with state policy and is important for supporting the development of 
Vietnam’s military, defense industry, and strategy toward China.  
a. Developments with India 
India’s 1991 “Look East” policy, initially focusing on increasing political and 
economic ties, has evolved to include defense issues, and the 2007 Joint Declaration on 
Strategic Partnership marked a turning point in defense relations with Vietnam.263 
Progressing ties beyond cooperation agreements signed in 1994, 2000, and 2003, the 
countries elevated the relationship to a strategic partnership in 2007.264 Indian leaders 
acted almost immediately upon the defense component of the November 2007 agreement 
by sending 5,000 spare parts to Vietnam for the refurbishment of naval ships and 
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agreeing to cooperate “in national defense, navy, air defense and training.”265 Vietnam 
had only previously initiated a similar level of cooperation with Russia in 2001 and Japan 
in 2006; however, unlike Japan, India has considerable experience with Soviet era 
weaponry and Russian-produced equipment.266 The 2007 agreement was important, 
because it introduced expanded defense cooperation and provided a framework for the 
countries to follow and strengthen.  
Events in 2013 and 2014 improved upon the 2007 strategic partnership, because 
India and Vietnam agreed to expand training opportunities and arms sales.267 During 
2013, India offered Vietnam a substantial loan for the country to purchase Indian-made 
military equipment and announced the transfer of four patrol boats to be built in 
Vietnam.268 Along with the patrol boat sales, India also announced that it would provide 
submarine training for 500 Vietnamese sailors in preparation for Vietnam’s new 
underwater capabilities.269 These developments are noteworthy considering prior to 
2013, the majority of defense deals “focused on Hanoi’s purchase of spare parts and 
components for fitting onto Russian-made materiel in service with the VPA.”270 From 
September to October 2014, the countries agreed to deepen their strategic partnership to 
include expanded joint exercises, training programs, defense equipment cooperation, and 
the likely sale of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile.271 The expanded training 
programs are expected to include Vietnam’s Sukhoi pilots, and the potential acquisition 
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of the BrahMos cruise missile strengthens Vietnam’s deterrence strategy.272 Ankit Panda 
adds, “The supersonic missiles would allow Vietnam to threaten any naval assets that 
China may choose to use in the future against Vietnamese interests.”273 Publicly 
announcing his commitment to the modernization of Vietnam’s military, Indian Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi recently referred to defense relations with Vietnam as among his 
country’s most important.274 The 2013 and 2014 developments revealed strengthened ties 
between two countries moving toward greater defense cooperation.  
Defense ties with India are important for Vietnam, because they lessen its 
dependency on Russian arms.275 Regarding a November 2013 visit by the CPV’s 
secretary general to India, Thayer writes, “Vietnam seeks to leverage India’s expertise 
and experience with Soviet/Russian military technology to its advantage and mitigate the 
risk of dependency on a sole supplier.”276 Another author indicates that “India could 
potentially be the most ideal non-Russian source of military technologies for Vietnam’s 
arms diversification attempts.”277 While India could potentially be Vietnam’s most ideal 
partner, it has traditionally been unreliable, “proving itself uncompetitive, bureaucratic, 
politically hesitant in supplying weapons to Vietnam.”278 The 2013 and 2014 agreements 
were important for altering this perception. Both countries operate similar weaponry and 
are eager to expand defense ties. For Vietnam, developments since 2007 are important, 
because they reveal India as an ideal alternative for defense cooperation outside of the 
former Soviet Union. 
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Vietnam’s relations with India are also important, because they have led to an 
increased Indian presence at Vietnam’s ports and in the SCS, boosting Vietnam’s 
economic and defense efforts.279 Economically, India has a keen interest in building 
Vietnam’s defense capacity, which in turn benefits Vietnam’s defense industry. 
Additionally, both countries are collaborating to exploit potential energy resources in the 
SCS.280 Previously offering seven oil block contracts to India in 2013, Vietnam offered 
an additional two blocks to India during the 2014 meetings.281 Defensively, the Indian 
Navy’s (IN) increased presence reveals to China that the countries share similar strategic 
interests and that an emerging power—whose “navy is more advanced than China’s in 
some respect”—has unique access to Vietnam.282 After 2011, the CPV granted the IN 
greater access to its ports in an effort to “draw…closer to China’s Hainan Island, where a 
major PLAN base in Sanya is located.”283 The Indian press reported the developments—
specifically access to the new Nha Trang port—as “a first for any foreign navy,” 
providing the IN a greater SCS reach and positioning it much closer to China’s South Sea 
Fleet.284 China would prefer less presence by the Indians. It expressed its discontent in 
2011 over a joint energy venture in SCS waters and later over the INS Airavat steaming 
toward Vietnam’s northern-most port at Haiphong.285 Vietnam is still building its 
capacity to project power into the SCS, but its relationship with India leads to a SCS 
presence, which complements its security efforts.286  
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b. Developments with the United States 
Vietnam-US relations have improved considerably due to the success of the 2007 
Pacific Partnership exercise, which Robert Lucius characterizes “as a watershed in the 
development of the bilateral military relationship.”287 During the USS Peleliu’s 10-day 
visit at Danang Harbor, Vietnamese medical professionals worked with nongovernmental 
organizations and military personnel from Asia-Pacific nations and the United States to 
treat over 3,500 patients.288 Specific coordinating events included: biomedical repair 
teams restoring equipment at 12 Vietnamese health clinics; participating countries’ health 
professionals engaging in exchanges, discussions, and training; and U.S. Navy 
construction battalions building or repairing schools, an orphanage, and medical 
clinics.289 For the first time, a U.S. warship partnered with a civilian ministry in Vietnam, 
and for the first time in 40 years, a foreign navy’s landing craft operated in Vietnam’s 
territorial waters.290 Lastly and also for the first time, CPV leaders allowed observers to 
join the mission during follow-on activities at other countries.291 This exercise was 
important, because it “set a precedent for cooperation…without accelerating the bilateral 
defense relationship at a pace beyond that which the People’s Army was capable of or 
willing to accept.”292 Involving previously unseen coordination, this exercise built trust 
between the countries, propelled both into more collaborative humanitarian projects, and 
revealed America’s eagerness to participate in Vietnam’s capacity-building.293  
From July 2013 to October 2014, defense relations between Vietnam and the 
United States transformed to include a comprehensive partnership and the partial lifting 
of a 30-year-old arms embargo; both measures aim to bolster maritime capabilities.294 In 
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July 2013, the countries strengthened a previously established 2011 MOU by creating the 
U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership, which includes nine cooperative areas 
including defense and security.295 Under the partnership, the countries have emphasized 
maritime security cooperation, aiming to increase coast guard collaboration and 
transform the VCG “into a more effective player in the maritime governance of SEA.”296 
In December 2013, Washington provided a $32.5 million USD aid package to SEA 
nations for the boosting of maritime security—over half went to Vietnam.297 The U.S.-
Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership was important, because it provided a framework for 
strengthening defense ties and especially Vietnam’s maritime capabilities. In October 
2014, the United States partially lifted its arms embargo on Vietnam, and the U.S. State 
Department declared that it only “applied to weapons for maritime purposes.”298 Thayer 
writes, “The changed U.S. policy is aimed at bolstering Vietnam’s Coast Guard by 
providing patrol boats, coastal radar and maritime surveillance aircraft.”299 The partial 
lifting of the arms embargo was extremely important for boosting Vietnam’s maritime 
capabilities and for building trust between the countries.300 The developments in 2013 
and 2014 have been the most notable events since 2007 and indicate a clear priority by 
U.S. officials “to enhance the capabilities of the VCG to defend itself.”301  
Defense ties with the United States are important for Vietnam, because they can 
strengthen Vietnam’s military modernization efforts, particularly in the maritime 
environment.302 While the relationship lags behind Vietnam’s relations with India, it also 
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has the potential to diminish Vietnam’s reliance on Russian defense imports with the 
partial lifting of the arms embargo. Additionally, the United States could prove a more 
reliable, stronger defense partner than India. The partial lifting of the embargo means that 
the United States “has moved beyond diplomatic rhetoric and support for international 
law to a strategy that now embraces arming littoral states to defend themselves in their 
maritime domain.”303 It behooves Vietnam to take advantage of this policy shift, because 
U.S. equipment such as armed patrol craft and the P-3 Orion MPA could dramatically 
improve Vietnam’s ability to monitor its maritime environment. Along with equipment 
sales, training opportunities with the U.S. Coast Guard can improve the VCG’s ability “to 
deter—if not respond to—Chinese assertiveness without directly dragging the United 
States into a naval confrontation with China.”304 
Maintaining defense ties with the United States is also important for Vietnam if 
Chinese aggression persists or increases in the SCS.305 In a similar way that India’s 
presence in the SCS perturbs China, U.S. warships in contested waters prevents China 
from exerting max influence over the SCS. The USS Vandergraft’s port call at Saigon in 
November 2003 marked the first visit by a U.S. warship in over 30 years.306 Subsequent 
U.S. warship visits in 2004 and 2005 helped solidify relations between U.S. military 
attaches located in Vietnam and their colleagues in Vietnam’s MOD External Relations 
Department.307 In 2006, the CPV lifted its one-ship-per-year policy with the United 
States, allowing the USS Patriot and USS Salvor to visit simultaneously in July—a first 
for Vietnam.308 While ship visits and general defense relations have increased, some U.S. 
officials perceive “red lines that Vietnam does not want to cross for fear of upsetting 
Beijing or further stoking the latter’s concerns about U.S. attempts to contain it.”309 If 
Chinese aggression in the SCS continues, certain authors indicate that Vietnam will cross 
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these red lines, because a stronger U.S.-Vietnam partnership will preserve strategic 
interests in Vietnam and ease public concern over whether the CPV is protecting its 
sovereignty.310 China may never cause Vietnam to cross this red line, but if it does, the 
United States and Vietnam will have already experienced successful collaborative efforts, 
developing trust and a foundation for increased ties. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Boasting increased defense capabilities and expanded foreign relations, Vietnam’s 
military has changed significantly since the Doi Moi reforms and continues to evolve 
amid a dynamic regional maritime environment.311 Today, Vietnam’s ground force is a 
shell of its former 1980s strength, but while it has diminished in importance for the 
military, the government has drastically improved the navy, coast guard, and to a lesser 
extent, the air force. Submarines, fighter jets, and indigenous shipbuilding have been 
among the most notable developments for Vietnam’s military. Vietnam is no longer 
isolated and relying on a sole supplier for equipment and defense collaboration. Defense 
ties with India and the United States resulted from the country’s desire to seek stronger 
defense partners, and these ties have allowed Vietnam to lessen its dependency on Russia 
and maintain a friendly, foreign presence in its waters that contributes “to maritime 
security by balancing Chinese military power.”312  
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III. THE CAUSES OF MILITARY MODERNIZATION IN 
VIETNAM 
Enabled by economic growth, Vietnam’s military modernization program is 
mainly a response to China’s assertive behavior in the SCS but is also a response to 
Vietnam’s socioeconomic development strategies. China has a history of acting 
assertively toward Vietnam, and aspects of the CPV’s military modernization program 
are aimed at deterring or decreasing China’s actions in the maritime environment.313 
Military modernization efforts are also intended to ease fears of China’s encroachment 
and to challenge China’s overwhelming power advantage in the SCS. However, another 
cause of modernization is Vietnam’s economic growth, which has allowed the country to 
update its capabilities and partnerships. CPV leaders have prioritized industrialization 
and a modernizing defense industry in turn benefits the economy.314 This chapter 
presents the primary motivating factors behind Vietnam’s military modernization and 
closes with a balanced explanation, including aspects of both arguments.  
A. CHINA’S INFLUENCE  
Vietnam’s military modernization program is likely due mainly to China’s 
assertive SCS behavior, a desire to diminish fears of losing territory, and an attempt to 
mitigate the two states’ asymmetric relationship. Since the early 1950s, the PRC has 
attempted to assert control over the SCS, and it has operated with little to no regard for 
the territorial claims of Vietnam and other nations (See Figure 1). China’s actions have 
resulted in Vietnam losing maritime territory and shifting its military focus to the 
maritime domain. China’s assertive behavior has continued in step with Vietnam’s 
military modernization. Having suffered numerous invasions, Vietnam has a bitter history 
with its larger neighbor, and China’s recent actions have exacerbated fears inside 
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Vietnam.315 The country’s military modernization program is aimed at easing these fears 
and thus limiting internal criticism of the CPV.316 Moreover, Brantly Womack argues 
that Vietnam has experienced an asymmetric relationship with China for centuries; I 
contend that defense procurements and partnerships are also intended to change this 
uneven structure.317  Figure 1 illustrates the territorial claims by the countries involved in 
the SCS dispute. 
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1. China’s Assertive Behavior 
 Initially, the PRC pursued the Paracel Islands and sought to eradicate Vietnam’s 
control there. In 1956, the Chinese successfully conquered the eastern portion of the 
Paracels—the country’s first occupation at the archipelago.319 Three years later, 
Vietnamese forces denied a Chinese advance toward the western Paracels or Crescent 
Group and captured over 80 Chinese soldiers disguised as fishermen.320 After significant 
force reductions by the South Vietnamese on the western Paracels and by the U.S. Navy 
in the SCS, Chinese naval vessels sailed toward the Crescent Group in early 1974.321 The 
Chinese crushed the Vietnamese, captured the entire Paracel archipelago, and declared 
sovereignty over the island grouping.322 At the time, South and North Vietnam had yet to 
unite as a single country, and the North viewed the loss as the South’s problem.323 The 
North did not protest the Chinese occupation at the Paracels, but Vietnam still claimed 
the island grouping after unification.324 By 1976, Vietnam had lost control of one of its 
archipelagos, but it did not pursue a modernized military until after China’s decision to 
target the Spratlys.  
Several years after capturing the Paracel Islands, China shifted its attention 
southward to pursue a presence at the Spratly Islands. China’s leadership ordered survey 
operations during the early 1980s, and in 1987, the PLAN began occupying Spratly 
Island reefs. Realizing the PRC’s intentions, Vietnam responded by attempting to occupy 
more territory. The two countries continued this reef-hopping campaign with little 
conflict until March 1988. At this time, both governments ordered the opposing forces to 
evacuate Johnson Reef, and it took the PLAN less than one hour to sink several 
Vietnamese ships and kill over 60 Vietnamese sailors. Lacking the necessary capabilities 
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to confront and deter China, Vietnam’s navy was no match for the PLAN in 1988. By 
1989 and to Vietnam’s dismay, China had established a physical presence on the 
Spratlys, and Vietnamese leadership realized that their military required modernization in 
certain areas.325  
From 1989 to the present, China gradually intensified its assertive behavior in the 
SCS. Vietnam endorsed an ASEAN statement of concern in 1995 after the PRC 
“occupied and constructed buildings on Mischief Reef” from late 1994 to March 1995.326 
This event marked China’s most aggressive SCS behavior in almost seven years. Since 
1999, the PRC has imposed fishing bans from May to August, subjecting Vietnamese 
fisherman to “harassment, ill treatment, seizure of fish catches, confiscation of GPS 
navigational equipment, tools and spares, and physical violence against Vietnamese 
fishing crews including fatalities.”327 Chinese vessels have harassed local Vietnamese oil 
companies as well as foreign companies contracted by the CPV to explore SCS 
hydrocarbon deposits. Chinese forces cut the cables of a PetroVietnam survey ship in 
2011; the Chinese ships contained “specialized cable- cutting devices.”328 In May 2014, 
Chinese forces escorted a deep sea drilling rig to Vietnam’s EEZ—130 nautical miles 
from Vietnam’s coast.329 China withdrew the structure in July 2014 after deploying water 
cannon and ramming VCG ships attempting to disrupt rig operations. Showing few signs 
of altering its behavior in the SCS, China continues to ignore Vietnam’s sovereignty 
claims and to interfere with Vietnamese operations in the SCS.  
                                                 
325 Paragraph details pulled directly from Jeff Benson, “South China Sea: A History of Armed 
Conflict,” USNI News, June 20, 2012, http://news.usni.org/2012/06/20/south-china-sea-history-armed-
conflict. 
326 Ibid., 8; Vietnam refers to the SCS as the East Sea 
327 Thayer, “Vietnam’s East Sea Strategy.” 
328 Bloomberg News, “Vietnam Says Chinese Boat Harassed Survey Ship; China Disputes,” 
BusinessWeek: Undefined, June 9, 2011, http://Army.businessweek.com/news/2011-06-09/vietnam-says-
chinese-boat-harassed-survey-ship-china-disputes.html. 
329 “China Sends Four Oil Rigs to South China Sea amid Regional Tensions,” Reuters, June 20, 2014, 
http://Army.reuters.com/article/2014/06/20/us-china-southchinasea-rigs-idUSKBN0EV0WG20140620. 
 57 
2. Responding to Fears and Challenging Asymmetry  
China has historically harassed Vietnam, and Vietnam’s military modernization 
could be an attempt to overcome or ease fear stemming from Chinese aggression. As a 
country, Vietnam has a long history of both resisting hostile Chinese forces and showing 
deference to its larger neighbor. Kaplan writes that because Vietnam cannot escape 
China’s embrace, Vietnam’s history is largely concentrated on one aspect—resisting 
China.330 Maps and artifacts at Vietnam’s History Museum commemorate Vietnam’s 
resistance against eleventh, fifteenth, and eighteenth century Chinese dynasties, and the 
Ngoc Son temple honors Vietnam’s defeat over the thirteenth century Yuan.331 China has 
invaded Vietnam seventeen times, and school textbooks relay stories of resistance heroes 
fighting China.332 While Vietnam previously acted as a Chinese outpost, China’s Han 
Dynasty conquered Vietnam in 111BC.333 Placing Vietnam under tributary state status, 
the Chinese occupied Vietnam for almost a millennium.334 Vietnam won independence in 
the tenth century over the Tang Dynasty, and subsequent Ly, Tran, and Le Dynasties 
repelled Chinese armies from the north; however, for twenty years, Vietnam lost control 
to China’s Ming Dynasty in the fifteenth century.335 Even through the modern era, 
China’s desire to meddle in Vietnam’s affairs continued as China helped the French 
battle Vietnam in 1946 and invaded Vietnam again in 1979. Chinese leader Deng 
Xiaoping’s 1979 invasion aimed at “bleeding Vietnam white.”336 Deng’s plan worked 
too, because it entangled Vietnam in a guerilla war that damaged its economy, forcing 
drastic reform.337 These events point to China’s inability to leave Vietnam alone and 
accept its independence.338  
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Vietnam has been interested in preventing the SCS from becoming China’s inner 
sea, and China’s recent actions have reminded Vietnamese of centuries-long Chinese 
aggression.339 Le Hong Hiep writes, “China’s re-emergence as a proto-superpower in 
recent decades…has necessarily renewed and intensified Vietnam’s China challenge.”340 
China’s rise threatens Vietnam, and its leaders understand that China will require SCS 
energy resources, which Vietnam relies on too.341 In 1999, Thayer wrote that “Vietnam 
has always been wary of excessive Chinese influence in Vietnam.”342 According to 
Henry Kamm, Vietnam distrusts China, and the suspicion and fear of its giant neighbor 
transcends and unites all Vietnamese classes.343 This unifying impact was evident, for 
example, in 2007 when street demonstrations involving over 200 students occurred in 
front of China’s embassy as China announced its plans to incorporate the competing 
archipelagos under a new local authority.344 Similarly, violence against Chinese-owned 
factories in Vietnam occurred in May 2014 after China’s decision to park a gigantic oil 
rig in contested waters.345 Fear of China can promote nationalist tendencies among 
Vietnamese citizens, which often creates an unstable internal security environment for the 
CPV. Adding capabilities and partnerships can ease these fears and stabilize the country 
by assuring citizens that the government is pursuing measures to deter China in the SCS 
and protect its sovereignty.346  
Brantly Womack characterizes the Sino-Vietnam relationship as asymmetric. 
China holds the stronger position and is therefore less attentive to the relationship than 
Vietnam. Vietnam is more attentive, because it feels vulnerable to a much stronger China. 
There are two relationships here: China and Vietnam, Vietnam and China. Both countries 
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treat the relationship differently and interpret the other’s behavior differently. During 
peace or war, the Chinese have never viewed the Vietnamese as their equal. For Vietnam, 
China is the mysterious and giant neighbor to the north who controls the relationship. 
Vietnam is caught in a dilemma, because, while it needs peace with China, it risks losing 
its autonomy and national substance if pushed around by China. Vietnam fears 
uncontrolled contact by the Chinese and any Chinese attempt to undermine its 
sovereignty. Vietnam recognizes China as a global power, but also thinks China is 
manipulative toward Vietnam. The asymmetric situation has strengthened with China’s 
economic and military rise, and though normalization finally occurred in 1991, the event 
did not symbolize perfect harmony. During the 1990s and continuing today, the 
conflicting issues have surrounded the maritime environment. This asymmetric 
relationship has historically shown few signs of altering in a drastic way.347  
When Vietnam resists China, it does so because Vietnam desires to “maintain its 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political autonomy.”348 China has revealed a lack of 
respect for these desires. A contemporary example of this asymmetric relationship and 
Vietnam’s resistance occurred in May 2014 when China parked a giant oil rig inside 
Vietnam’s EEZ. Thayer called the act “unexpected, provocative, and illegal.”349 In 
response to the rig placement, Vietnam dispatched VCG and FSF vessels to confront 
Chinese forces surrounding the rig.350 As Vietnam’s maritime forces maintained a 
presence near the rig even after being rammed by Chinese forces and losing a fishing 
boat, CPV leadership sought negotiations with China, and Beijing withdrew the rig after 
a month and a half near Vietnam’s coast.351 At the beginning of June 2014, China had 
brought 125 total maritime forces to the contested area.352 For perspective, this event 
occurred before the CPV decided to arm FSF vessels, and if Vietnam had dispatched its 
entire VCG, it would have totaled less than 40 vessels. Regarding its sovereignty and 
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maritime territory, Vietnam has a weaker coastal force than China, but it is not afraid to 
confront its larger neighbor even if the current relationship is asymmetric.  
Vietnam is pursuing military modernization to challenge the asymmetric 
relationship. Vietnam understands its position but also understands that with a few key 
military items, it can possibly force China to be more attentive to the relationship and less 
harassing. U.S. Naval War College Professor Lyle Goldstein claims that China closely 
monitors Vietnam’s military modernization, respects its air force, and worries about 
Vietnam’s new submarine capability.353 In October 2013, Thayer added, “By the end of 
this year the naval balance of power in the South China Sea will begin to alter when 
Vietnam takes delivery of its first Kilo-class fast attack submarines.”354 It is likely that 
Vietnam has purchased better equipment and warmed closer to India and the United 
States to feel less vulnerable. By acquiring specific weaponry and developing relations 
with countries who share similar strategic goals in the SCS, Vietnam desires China to be 
more attentive to the relationship. History has revealed the relationship as asymmetric, 
but Vietnam’s pursuit and effective use of defense partnerships and better equipment are 
aimed at altering China’s perception and SCS tactics.355  
3. Hanoi’s Response 
In response to China’s increasingly assertive behavior, Vietnam has updated its 
capabilities and embraced unconventional warfare strategies again. In 1988, the country 
had no coast guard capability and operated older aircraft and naval vessels. After 
reaching a more comfortable economic level, Vietnam’s desire to pursue military 
modernization began. The mid-1990s mark this initiation, and Thayer calls it a “response 
to sovereignty disputes with China in the East Sea in the 1990s.”356 The mid-1990s focus 
occurred as China conquered Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands. Acquisitions since 
then have been aimed at upgrading air and sea capabilities to protect Vietnam’s 
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“territorial integrity and national sovereignty in the SCS.”357 Vietnam’s new Su-30 
fighters provide the country with more capable aircraft to defend “sovereignty over its 
features in the SCS.”358 Additionally, defense leaders continue to acquire MPA to 
monitor territorial waters. Modernization of the coast guard “has accelerated as Vietnam 
has reacted to growing tension in the disputed waters of the South China Sea.”359 
Demonstrating Vietnam’s ability to confront China and show resolve, the coast guard 
responded to China’s giant oil rig emplacement in May 2014.360 Ultimately, Vietnam is 
hoping that its submarines can check China’s actions in the SCS, and its navy will soon 
own the region’s newest, quietest submarines.361 These acquisitions are meant to build a 
deterrent against China and to create a “circumstance where China would have to accept 
the status quo or escalate.”362 If the Vietnamese can create a psychological deterrent, then 
the navy can practice an A2/AD strategy, which “is really the only good way to counter 
China’s attempts at enforcing its territorial claims in disputed waters.”363 Often employed 
by weaker forces, asymmetric strategies are a familiar warfare for Vietnam, masterfully 
employing guerilla warfare tactics against France, the United States, and China in 
previous generations.364 Vietnam is unable to match China ship for ship, and embracing 
guerrilla warfare in the maritime environment may result in its most effective strategy.365 
It remains to be seen whether Vietnam can alter China’s actions, but the CPV’s quest for 
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newer air and sea capabilities—especially submarines—appears to be an attempt to end 
China’s assertive behavior.  
To counter the Chinese, ease domestic fears, and challenge the asymmetric 
relationship, Vietnamese leaders have completely embraced defense diplomacy too. 
Developed two months after the Johnson Reef event in 1988, the CPV’s Resolution No. 
13 “shifted [Vietnam’s] foreign policy from one of confrontation to one of 
accommodation with former foes.”366 Essentially, Vietnam’s defense ministry pursued a 
similar accommodating and omnidirectional strategy with the international community. 
Hiep notes, “Facing a far more powerful China, Vietnam has been employing a multi-
tiered, omni-directional hedging strategy to handle its relations with its northern 
neighbor.”367 The CPV understands the importance of its strategic position, but the 
country lacks the political and military clout to influence or pressure China. Thayer adds, 
“Vietnam engages in hedging by encouraging the major powers…to contribute to 
maritime security by balancing Chinese military power.”368  
An expanded defense relationship in 2000 and a strategic partnership in 2007 
have led to increased ties between Vietnam and India, both states sharing territorial 
disputes with China. India has taken an active role in providing spare parts and submarine 
training to Vietnam and has recently agreed to training Vietnamese pilots, selling patrol 
ships, and possibly providing long-coveted short range cruise missiles to Vietnam.369 
India is wary of the PLAN’s Indian Ocean presence, and considering the IN’s power 
projection limitations, Vietnam could provide India a “naval poke to China as and when 
needed.”370  
In October 2014, the United States partially lifted a ban on lethal item sales to 
Vietnam, and the New York Times credited the move to both states facing “a common 
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challenge in China.”371 Since normalization in 1995, the U.S.-Vietnam relationship has 
evolved in a positive direction, and some Vietnamese strategists argue that “only the U.S. 
can alter China’s SCS calculus so as to deter it from using military force to change the 
status-quo.”372 A strong U.S. presence in the SCS shows few signs of diminishing, and 
Vietnam has welcomed U.S. port visits and training opportunities with the Americans 
since 2003.  
In 2014, before the oil rig crisis, Vietnam suggested that Japan and the United 
States join it in a trilateral security dialogue, and Vietnam has included Japan in talks 
with the Philippines to increase maritime patrols and training.373 Thayer writes, 
“Vietnam’s strategy puts the onus on China to decide whether or not to shoulder the risk 
of attacking mixed formations of Vietnamese naval vessels and aircraft operating in 
conjunction with American allies, the Philippines and Japan, or U.S. military 
personnel.”374 Vietnam is using defense diplomacy to hedge against China, and its 
relations the United States, India, Japan, and the Philippines are central aspects of this 
strategy.375  
B. ECONOMIC INFLUENCE 
While China has motivated the acquisition of specific military capabilities and 
partnerships, Vietnam’s economic growth has enabled the overall military modernization 
and has also promoted a stronger defense industry. The 1986 Doi Moi reforms initiated 
changes in economic policy, which ultimately led to rapid economic growth during the 
2000s.376 As a result of these reforms and subsequent growth, the CPV increased 
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partnerships, defense spending, and procurements.377 Additionally, the CPV has 
prioritized the goal of becoming an industrialized nation by 2020.378 The pursuit of a 
modernized military has helped improve Vietnam’s defense industry, because defense 
partnerships have led to capacity-building inside the country. After the 1988 13
th
 
Politburo Resolution, a stronger economy, sufficient defense, and an expanded foreign 
policy became necessary to ensure national security.379 Those goals are still important 
today, and Vietnam’s economy and military modernization are interdependent. 
1. Economic Growth Enables Military Modernization 
Vietnam’s economic focus has enabled and promoted an increase in defense 
relations.380 The Doi Moi reforms placed economic reforms as a priority, but to 
accomplish those goals, Vietnam’s attitude toward non-communist states required 
transformation.381 After the 1986 6
th
 National Congress, the Politburo’s 1987 Resolution 
No. 2 and the 1988 Resolution No. 13 initiated the transformation, because following 
these resolutions, leaders pulled ground forces out of Cambodia and Laos, cut ground 
forces by half, and adopted diverse foreign policy strategies.382 These changes were made 
because Vietnam’s economy was suffering, and because Mikhail Gorbachev began to 
emanate new political thoughts.383 When Gorbachev’s USSR collapsed in 1991, Vietnam 
was forced to fully embrace these policies and the defense sector faced challenges, briefly 
losing its primary defense partner.384 Months before the Soviet Union’s collapse, the 
CPV’s Seventh National Congress declared its desire to be friends with all countries, 
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because the country needed to grow less isolated to overcome economic shortfalls.385 By 
focusing primarily on economic development, Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA) and its MOD have expanded internationally to attract partners and investment. 
For defense leaders, this expansion has meant advanced agreements and partnerships 
including countries such as India and the United States. Without a renewed economic 
focus beginning in 1986, it is possible that Vietnam’s defense sector would have 
remained isolated and unable to modernize effectively.  
Additionally, Vietnam’s defense spending and emphasis on military 
modernization correlates with economic growth.386 From 2000 to 2010, Vietnam’s real 
economic growth averaged 7.3%, but its performance was most notable from 2000 to 
2007.387 During this period, defense spending increased as a result of economic growth, 
and Table 1 provides a snapshot of the correlation between economic performance and 
defense spending. This performance allowed Vietnam to begin updating its air force in 
2003 with the introduction of Su-30 fighter aircraft.388 In 2005, this growth provided the 
navy the ability to order newer frigates and maritime patrol aircraft.389 Local shipbuilding 
firms improved during this era and provided Vietnam’s Coast Guard with the majority of 
its current vessels.390 Though Vietnam officially ordered its Kilo-class submarines in 
2008 during the global financial crisis, the country initiated plans for submarine 
purchases at the beginning of its economic surge; a 2000 defense agreement with India 
hinted at submarine training.391  
Vietnam’s economic growth since Doi Moi has made military modernization 
possible.392 Current Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung remarks, “We modernize our 
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armed forces when the economic conditions allow, and that is normal.”393 A developing 
country choosing to increase military capabilities is not a new phenomenon. The 
Pentagon has attributed China’s military rise to its staggering economic growth.394 
Vietnam’s economic growth has been lower than China’s, but has still provided the 
resources for the government to increase defense spending. After the country had shown 
signs of recovering from effects of the global financial crisis, Thayer claimed that the 
2010 order of additional Su-30 fighter aircraft was “linked to economic growth.”395 
Though the crisis impacted defense spending, Vietnam’s upward trend appears to have 
returned as of 2011, and the economy will likely dictate Vietnam’s continued military 
modernization.396  
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 Defense Budget and Real Economic Trends in Vietnam397 Table 1.  
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Official Defense Budget:           
U.S.$ (billion) 7.6 7.9 8.0 7.9 5.0 4.6 3.4 3.2 3.6 3.8 
Real Growth (%) 3.5 4.8 1.3 -0.5 -35.7 -0.5 -20.8 2.3 14.5 9.6 
Percentage of real GDP 5.6 5.5 5.2 4.8 2.9 2.8 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.2 
GDP:           
U.S.$ billion (real GDP) 136.1 145.3 154.1 164.2 169.6 165.2 163.6 160.9 167.7 170.0 
Real Growth (%) 7.8 7.5 7.0 7.1 5.7 5.4 6.4 6.2 5.2 5.3 
           
                                                 
397 Australia Defence Intelligence Organization, Defence Economic Trends in the Asia-Pacific (Canberra: 2014), author reproduced data from this source. 
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2. Economic Benefits of Military Modernization 
The domestic production of modernized military capabilities is a central aspect of 
Vietnam’s socio-economic strategies, and updating capabilities promotes capacity-
building and economic growth.398 During the CPV’s 11th National Congress in 2011, 
Vietnamese leaders agreed that the country would continue striving to become modern 
and industrialized by 2020.399 Vietnam’s Socio-Economic Development Strategy for the 
Period of 2011–2020 provides the government a guideline for achieving economic 
goals.400 Among many recommendations, it stresses industrial development, achieving an 
independent economy, and utilizing outside resources for the country’s development.401 
Improving the country’s defense industry is an aspect of this plan, and foreign partners 
are necessary to provide guidance in improving military industrial capabilities.402 Global 
management consulting firm McKinsey & Company adds, “As Southeast Asian countries 
strive to develop their own broader industrial capabilities, partnerships with international 
defense players could provide an avenue for capability and knowledge transfers.”403 
Vietnam’s military modernization strategy aims to widen its procurement network but to 
also improve its industrial capacity by leveraging the talents of international partners.404 
Jon Grevatt writes, “This strategy has seen Vietnam enter defense collaboration 
partnerships with the Czech Republic, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Poland, and 
Spain.”405 By allowing outside governments to assist in defense industry development, 
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the country can reduce its dependence on imports, and possibly begin to develop a 
competitive industry of its own. Modernization is a benefit to Vietnam’s economy 
because it helps strengthen industrial capacity and “enhance self-sufficiency”—key 
socioeconomic goals for the CPV.406  
Furthermore, Vietnam’s most recent defense white paper reveals the importance 
of modernizing to benefit the economy. To support “rapid and sustainable economic 
growth,” Vietnam seeks to “develop both its socio-economic and defense capabilities and 
closely coordinate defense-security and diplomatic activities to support the cause of 
industrialization and modernization.”407 Defense leaders argue that scientific and 
technological investment in the country’s national defense combined with the absorption 
of technologies from the international community contributes toward and is the driving 
force behind economic development.408 Vietnam’s economic performance after Doi Moi 
shaped its approach to military modernization, because the performance made leaders 
realize the benefits of international cooperation. This realization has led leaders to 
prioritize international partnerships, because Vietnam hopes to develop defense industries 
enough to become self-reliant.409 Vietnam is determined to be an industrialized, 
modernized nation by 2020, and boosting its defense industry aids the military and more 
importantly, the economy.  
Two areas where international partners have begun to improve Vietnam’s defense 
industry include UAVs and ships. UAV capabilities provide Vietnam a cheaper 
alternative for surveillance outside of MPA, and learning to develop these systems is an 
easier task than attempting to build manned aircraft. Vietnam’s UAV focus has allowed 
outside companies to penetrate the country’s market, including Russia’s Irkut and 
Sweden’s UMS.410 Jon Grevatt notes, “The latter is representative of Vietnam’s 
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increasing willingness to diversify its military suppliers.”411 Transferring technology, co-
developing, and co-producing systems to meet Vietnam’s needs, UMS is working in 
coordination with VASA to ultimately “be able to export jointly developed UAV 
products to regional customers.”412 Obviously, this partnership can benefit Vietnam’s 
economy. In regards to shipbuilding, Vietnam is attempting to become a leading world 
developer, and this focus has led to the Netherlands’ Damen Shipyards collaborating with 
Vietnamese shipbuilding companies.413 After 2012, the coast guard received its first of 
four helicopter capable offshore patrol vessels (OPV) from local shipyard Z189; the 
shipyard is basing its design on materials provided by the Dutch.414 Signing MOUs with 
the Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Corporation and Vietnam Maritime University in 
2008, Norway has also taken an active role in boosting the country’s shipbuilding 
capacity.415 These developments indicate Vietnam’s pursuit of a stronger, more capable 
defense industry. The country is clearly striving to become more industrialized and more 
self-reliant in order to benefit its economy. Modernizing its military has provided 
Vietnam opportunities to leverage the capabilities of defense partners, and as the defense 
industry improves, Vietnam’s economy should benefit.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Enabled by strong economic performance, Vietnam’s military modernization 
program is aimed at boosting capabilities and building its industrial capacity. In turn, 
these two approaches allow Vietnam to pursue two mutually supporting goals—deterring 
China and developing its economy. The majority of literature points to China as the 
primary reason for Vietnam’s modernization. By acquiring targeted capabilities such as 
submarines and defense partnerships with India and the United States, Vietnamese 
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leaders hope to limit China’s assertive behavior, decrease their country’s fear of China, 
and alter the asymmetric relationship. Fewer writers reference internal factors for 
Vietnam’s modernization. CPV leaders initiated economic reforms in the 1980s, which 
resulted in economic growth.416 This growth has increased the resources available to the 
government and permitted it to invest in new defense equipment.417 Economic 
liberalization has led to increased partnerships with defense industries in countries other 
than Russia and has contributed to the development of a stronger domestic defense 
industry—a key goal for socio-economic development.418 Neither cause should dominate 
the narrative behind Vietnam’s military modernization. Instead, readers should 
understand that Vietnam is pursuing a parallel track toward two complementing goals.  
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IV. CLOSING THOUGHTS 
In Vietnam, fundamental defense policy shifts occurred after the introduction of 
the 1986 Doi Moi reforms.419 As Chapter II revealed, the CPV has made a conscious 
effort to update its military capabilities and increase its defense partnerships since then. 
The next logical step was to then explain the causes behind this military modernization. 
The beginning of this thesis offered two hypotheses, and Chapter III explicitly addressed 
both, generally including aspects of Chinese influence and Vietnam’s economic 
performance. First, Vietnam seeks to deter China in the SCS and acquiring modernized 
capabilities and particular partnerships increases the likelihood of this goal. Second, 
though economic performance has certainly enabled increased defense spending, 
Vietnam also seeks to develop its economy, and pursuing new capabilities and 
partnerships leads to capacity-building inside the country. Introduced in Chapter I, 
several implications stem from Vietnam’s pursuit of military modernization such as an 
increasingly destabilized or stabilized regional security environment. In closing, this 
chapter will assess both the hypotheses behind modernization and the implications of 
these findings for regional security. 
A. ASSESSING THE CAUSES BEHIND MODERNIZATION 
Vietnam’s Kilo submarines are its most impressive acquisitions to date and the 
greatest supporting evidence behind China’s influence on its military modernization. 
These acquisitions are geared toward establishing a formidable A2/AD strategy in the 
SCS.420 Regarding submarine developments, Thayer claims that “Vietnam is altering the 
naval balance in the SCS.”421 Others declare that with the addition of submarines, “the 
Vietnamese have changed the whole scenario.”422 The acquisition and successful 
employment of subsurface capabilities forces China to question its SCS tactics more than 
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any other capability.423 Vietnam understands that China “remains rather ill-equipped to 
stage an offensive against an opponent employing a submarine-enforced area denial 
strategy,” because China’s ASW capabilities “depend on proximity to Chinese bases for 
effectiveness.”424 Without submarines, some could argue that Vietnam’s military 
modernization program is aimed simply at boosting general maritime capabilities; 
however, with the inclusion of submarines, Vietnam has significantly strengthened the 
greatest strategy toward deterring China and preserving its maritime claims in the 
SCS.425 
Also providing supporting evidence behind China’s influence on its military 
modernization, Vietnam’s defense relations have expanded to include India and the 
United States. For Vietnam, India and the United States are ideal partners, because 
China’s rise threatens their strategic goals too. For primarily economic reasons, India and 
the United States seek a stable SCS environment, and China’s assertive behavior could 
threaten freedom of navigation there. India’s “Look East” strategy aims to project power 
into China’s sphere of influence, while China’s “String of Pearls” strategy seeks the same 
goal but in India’s sphere. Additionally, India maintains territorial disputes with China, 
and has shown an eagerness to boost Vietnam’s defense capacity and to establish a 
greater SCS presence.426 Allowing humanitarian exercises, ship visits, and coast guard 
coordination, Vietnam has increased defense ties with the United States since the early 
2000s, creating a suitable environment for Washington’s rebalance to the Asia-Pacific 
region.427 These developments are aimed at thwarting China’s rise and assertive 
behavior, because it “puts the onus on China to decide whether or not to shoulder the risk 
of attacking mixed formations of Vietnamese naval vessels and aircraft operating in 
conjunction with American allies, the Philippines and Japan, or U.S. military 
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personnel.”428 Vietnam believes that with a greater foreign presence in the SCS, China 
will be less likely to risk escalation.429 Moreover, the relationships that Vietnam is 
fostering with certain powers could prove beneficial if China were to choose massive 
escalation in the SCS.  
The evidence against China’s influence on the program includes Vietnam’s 
economic performance and official CPV modernization strategies, which target 
developing foreign ties to boost defense capacity.430 For Vietnam, a greater defense 
budget has correlated with greater economic performance, as revealed in Chapter III. This 
economic growth has allowed Vietnam to update its military capabilities, and its decision 
to acquire submarines falls in line with regional trends.431 Additionally, Vietnam’s 
relations with India and the United States are included in a broader defense diplomacy 
strategy that aims to develop arms sales and also defense industry collaboration.432 As 
stated in Vietnam’s 2007 maritime-focused strategy, its 2009 defense white paper, and its 
2011 Socio-Economic Development Strategy, Vietnam is seeking industrialization and 
boosting its defense capacity is a key goal toward that end.433 
The greatest evidence supporting the economic argument is Vietnam’s defense 
budget and its expanding defense industry. Chapter III described a correlation between 
Vietnam’s GDP and its defense budget. Its budget rose during times of increasing 
economic growth and contracted during periods of economic peril—the global financial 
crisis, for example.434 It was during a period of substantial economic growth—
specifically 2000 to 2007—that Vietnam began to make significant strides toward 
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updating its navy, air force, and coast guard.435 In 2007, Vietnam gained WTO 
membership and significantly advanced relations with both India and the United 
States.436 Key aspects surrounding its defense diplomacy include the establishment of 
arms sales and defense industry collaboration.437 Vietnam needs international partners to 
strengthen its defense industry and expedite its path toward general industrialization.438 
In doing so, Vietnam gains greater independence and inches closer toward fulfilling 
socioeconomic goals. These desires are illustrated in official documents, which this thesis 
has referenced.  
Evidence against the economic hypothesis includes the procurements Vietnam has 
made and the defense relationships it has developed since the start of Doi Moi in 1986. 
Updated fighter aircraft and Kilo submarines greatly enhance Vietnam’s A2/AD 
strategy.439 The Kilos are Vietnam’s first credible naval deterrent and are meant to make 
China question its assertive tactics in the SCS.440 Additionally, Vietnam’s defense 
diplomacy strategy has increasingly included China’s rivals—India, the United States, the 
Philippines, and Japan. The security interests of these four countries match those of 
Vietnam’s, and improved relations strengthen a hedging strategy meant “to counter undue 
pressure from China and deter Chinese aggression.”441 
The details of Vietnam’s military modernization have most notably included 
updates in maritime capabilities and defense relations, and Chapter III determined that 
both the China and economic hypotheses explain the main causes behind it. Both serve to 
explain its modernization, because deterring China and developing its economy are 
mutually supporting goals for the CPV. Neither explanation is more correct than the 
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other. The benefits of military modernization mean that Vietnam’s submarines can 
potentially deter China in the SCS and that its socioeconomic goal of industrialization is 
being met. China’s behavior has certainly motivated particular arms purchases, but a 
drive to industrialize and develop its economy has also motivated Vietnam’s defense 
diplomacy strategies. Chapter II illustrated the progress Vietnam has made in 
modernizing its military; particular arms purchases and expanding defense relationships 
are integral to that modernization.  
B. ASSESSING THE IMPLICATIONS BEHIND MODERNIZATION  
The beginning of this thesis offered two basic implications of Vietnam’s military 
modernization—destabilization and stabilization of the maritime environment in 
Southeast Asia. In general, Vietnam’s program will either cause China to act more 
aggressively before the Vietnamese can perfect deterrence, or it will lead to a stabilized 
environment wherefore Vietnam deters China and causes it to avoid assertive and 
escalatory measures. In closing, I offer several scenarios that could potentially lead to a 
destabilized or stabilized regional security environment.  
A destabilized environment likely depends in large part on China’s perception of 
Vietnam’s capabilities and defense relationships. If China feels that Vietnam’s Kilo 
submarines—or potential BrahMos cruise missiles—will deter it and create too unsafe of 
an environment, then China may hasten its assertive behavior before Vietnam achieves a 
fully credible deterrent. Similarly, if China realizes that Vietnam’s relations with the 
West are less than substantial and that it lacks the conviction to steer from its “three nos” 
defense policy, then Chinese forces will likely continue acting assertively, fearing no 
substantial third party intervention.442 Much depends on how Vietnam employs its 
eventual submarine capability and how far the CPV leadership is willing to accept 
China’s SCS tactics. A safe assessment is that Vietnam would likely continue employing 
mostly paramilitary assets in response to assertive Chinese behavior; however, if China 
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were to attack Vietnam’s shores, exchange ramming and water cannon tactics for deadly 
force against Vietnamese assets, or eliminate its entire ability to economically exploit the 
maritime environment, then the fallout could lead to massive destabilization if Vietnam 
lacks the support of third parties. 
A stabilized environment is likely to emerge if China respects Vietnam’s eventual 
deterrent capability. If Vietnam’s capabilities—submarines, defense relations, and 
potential cruise missiles—are enough to deter China, then PRC forces will likely proceed 
more cautiously, creating a more stable environment. Yet, this projection is much more 
likely in the long-term due to the following reasons: Vietnam’s submarine capabilities are 
far from reaching effectiveness, and the CPV has yet to reveal conduct indicating clear 
alignment with the West.  
Additionally, the type of assertive behavior employed by the Chinese could lead 
to a stabilized environment depending on Vietnam’s response. If China pushes Vietnam 
to the brink of imploring third parties for assistance, then China would likely limit its 
assertive behavior for fear of dramatic escalation. In its actions toward claimant states, 
China has sought to balance assertiveness and restraint in order to alter the status quo 
gradually and prevent others from turning completely against it. For Alexander Vuving, 
the May 2014 oil rig crisis erred on the wrong side of the balance, hailing it as the worst 
Sino-Vietnamese crisis since 1988. According to Vuving, the PRC’s decision to remove 
the rig stemmed from the CPV’s decision to drop any legal action and any involvement 
by third parties, particularly the West. China’s assertive tactics work if the other side 
chooses self-censorship, which a fear of escalation keeps in place. The best way to 
counter China’s tactics is to reveal that restraint is no longer one-sided; therefore, 
stabilization is more likely when Vietnam attempts to include other parties, returning a 
fear of escalation onto the PRC.443  
Finally, Vietnam seeks to place the choice of destabilizing the security 
environment squarely on China.444 Vietnam’s military modernization program is not 
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meant to retake SCS island groupings from China. Its forces have revealed no such 
assertive behavior, because it would risk escalation in an environment it wishes to keep 
peaceful and stable.445 China’s assertive behavior shows few signs of diminishing, but 
the benefits of Vietnam’s military modernization program—submarines and defense 
relations with the West—could potentially bring stability if employed in the most 
effective way.  
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